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Abstract
Interest group influence in the policy process is often assumed to occur through a mechanism of
exchange, persuasion, or subsidy. Here, we explore how business groups may also exert
influence by intimidating policymakers—a form of persuasion, but one based on the provision
not of policy information but of political information. We develop a theory where a business
firm lobbies a regulator to communicate political information about its capacity to commit to
future influence-seeking activities that would sanction the regulator. The regulator assesses the
credibility of this message by evaluating the firm’s commitment to lobbying. Guided by our
theory, we present empirical evidence consistent with expectations that intimidation can shape
regulatory outcomes to the advantage of certain firms, both through a chilling effect, where
lobbying derails nascent regulatory plans, as well as a retreating effect, where opposition to
published proposals leads to their withdrawal.
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Influence by Intimidation:
Business Lobbying in the Regulatory Process
Alex Acs & Cary Coglianese
Information, it is often said, is the lifeblood of regulatory policy (Coglianese et al 2004;
Stephenson 2010). This sentiment draws attention to the central role that policy information
plays in the regulatory process. Regulators seek to apply regulations in complex economic and
technological settings where their ability to acquire and analyze policy information is central to
their success (McCarty 2017). What is missing from this perspective, however, is that regulators
also seek political information—that is, information about interest groups affected by policies
they propose, especially groups that may oppose their proposals. Regulators particularly need to
know which groups hold influence in the larger political environment and would likely succeed
in mounting a resistance to a proposed policy change if they appealed to actors that oversee the
regulator. Political information allows regulators to assess which groups might “use their
weapons”—to borrow a phrase from Justice Stephen Breyer (1982)—and challenge regulatory
proposals they oppose.
Although policy information facilitates the development of substantive options, it is political
information that allows decision-makers to weigh those options and set priorities. In this respect,
the value of political information is not unique to regulatory policymaking. For regulators,
though, their vulnerability to oversight by Congress and the White House gives them distinctive
reasons to avoid decisions likely to “produce divided or hostile constituencies” (Wilson
1991:191). Hostility can generate political scrutiny and potentially impose further political
constraints on regulators’ day-to-day operations. To minimize resistance and backlash, regulators
try to anticipate any outside opposition to their plans and, if needed, make accommodations up
front, ideally before things get messy enough to draw attention. Of course, the possession of
political information can hardly guarantee regulators a positive outcome. In the eyes of some
observers, regulators are cursed with “the ever-present prospect of legal and political
challenges,” creating an atmosphere of heightened caution such that “it is often unclear when a
decision can be made” (Kagan 2003:198).
The idea that cautious regulators, concerned about interest group pushback, will recognize the
value of both policy and political information has certainly not gone unacknowledged (e.g.,
Yackee 2012). But strikingly, theories of interest group influence have typically either ignored or
downplayed the value of communicating political information as a means of influencing public
policy.1 Instead, these theories tend to focus on groups’ ability to provide policy information,
either to subsidize the development of policy options (Hall and Deardorff 2006) or to persuade
policymakers to make a more informed decision (Austen-Smith and Wright 1994; Cotton and
Déllis 2016; Cotton and Li 2018; Libgober 2019). Other theories treat interest group influence in
more transactional terms, with groups relying on quid pro quo arrangements for leverage, such
that something of value can be offered to a regulator in exchange for a desired policy outcome
1
An important exception is Gordon and Hafer (2005), upon whose signaling theory we build, extending their
approach from the context of regulatory enforcement to lobbying over the creation of regulations in the first place.
For further discussion, see Section 2 of this paper.
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(e.g., Grossman and Helpman 2002; Bennedsen and Feldmann 2006). Although each of these
theories provides important insights about group influence over policymaking, they tend to give
little regard to the ways in which interest groups’ transmission of political information may also
provide a notable source of influence.
In this paper, we develop a model of group influence that focuses on just such transmission.
Specifically, we consider how the extent of a group’s lobbying expenditure directed at a
regulator can, with little more, signal the group’s ability to challenge an action the regulator
might undertake. Our theory builds from the idea that groups make costly political expenditures
in part to convey their ability to impose costs on their opponents—a form of “muscle flexing”
(Gordon and Hafer 2005) or an expression of the group’s “willingness to fight” (Wright
1996:40)—or what we will refer to as “intimidation.” In the context of regulatory policymaking,
active lobbying by an interest group can convey to a regulator a credible prospect that the group
would be able to block the regulator, such as by elevating a potential conflict with the agency to
other arenas such as Congress, the White House, or the judiciary (McGarity 2012).
Groups generally have an incentive to establish this credibility early in the regulatory process,
before an agency adopts a proposal they oppose. If an unwanted proposal is nevertheless issued,
perhaps without advance knowledge by interest groups opposed to the proposal, these groups can
use active lobbying to convey their strength and seek to convince the agency to retreat. When
affected interest groups are successful, either in staving off proposed regulations in the first place
or in convincing regulators to withdraw regulatory proposals, these organizations exert influence
over regulatory policymaking without taking further action, thus forestalling the need to pull a
“fire alarm” alerting Congress or the White House (Hall and Miler 2008; Haeder and Yackee
2015), invest in shaping public opinion (Hall and Reynolds 2012), or take legal action against the
policies they oppose (Kagan 2003; Mashaw 1994). By simply expending resources to lobby over
a regulatory proposal and thereby communicating a credible ability to appeal to the agency’s
overseers, an interest group can establish a “footprint”—a signal of political power that can itself
be influential (Gordon and Hafer 2007).
In the context of this signaling strategy, consider the massive expenditures that firms incur in
lobbying regulators. Roughly half of all lobbying activity is directed toward influencing agencies
(You 2017; Boehmke, Gailmard, and Patty 2013). Regulatory agencies are regularly deluged
with phone calls, visits, letters, and other expressions of interest from businesses and other
organizations. Such informal contacts have been described as the “bread and butter” of the
rulemaking process (HBO v. FCC 1977). For most decisions that agencies make in initiating
rules not otherwise mandated by statute, “influence over such decisions is generally confined to
economic interests that communicate with agencies on a regular basis” (West and Raso
2013:516). Amid the overall cacophony of such communications, the active, even persistent,
lobbying by an interest group can give a regulator a credible signal of that group’s likely ability
to challenge the agency in other venues. Precisely because lobbying is costly, the expenditure of
lobbying efforts on its own—wholly independent of the substantive content or policy
information provided by a lobbyist—can be informative about a firm’s commitment to devoting
resources to mobilizing the agency’s overseers and impeding the agency from implementing a
regulatory proposal. This result can be expected even if the substance of a lobbying exchange is
not tangibly threatening—and seldom is it, at least not in the sense that the term “intimidation”
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might be colloquially understood. Meetings between lobbyists and regulators are often cordial
and facilitate the exchange of ideas and the building of relationships. Lobbyists reportedly
“spend a lot of time maintaining contact...listening, talking, monitoring” (Baumgartner et al.
2009:154)—activities that, even when they do not convey much policy information, can
nonetheless communicate important political information to regulators.
Some fragmentary evidence already suggests that persistent lobbying can be intimidating to
regulators, resulting in favorable treatment to active groups. For example, after the software
company Microsoft was sued by the Department of Justice (DOJ) for anti-competitive practices,
it significantly increased its lobbying expenditures, not just to influence the specific outcome of
DOJ’s case but also, as was reported at the time, to send a broader message of intimidation
(Morgan and Eilperin 1999; see also Gordon and Hafer 2005).2 Microsoft has not been under the
same regulatory pressure since, perhaps in part because the firm’s annual lobbying expenditures
have consistently been more than seven times higher than what they were in 1996, the year
before DOJ filed suit. More systematically, empirical evidence indicates that firms represented
by active lobbyists are less likely to be investigated for fraud by regulators such as the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) (Yu and Yu 2011).
Such firms also appear to enjoy lower effective tax rates (Richter, Samphantharak, and Timmons
2009).3
Our theory of lobbying is built around a simple two-player signaling model where an agency
weighs whether to change the policy status quo and a firm decides whether to pay to lobby the
agency. We assume that both the agency and the firm are perfectly informed about the linkage
between policies and outcomes (i.e., both are experts), but that the agency is imperfectly
informed about the firm’s preferences and, still more importantly, about its capacity to challenge
the agency’s proposal by appealing to an overseer. One of our key results, similar to Gordon and
Hafer (2005), is intuitive: the firm can make an upfront lobbying expenditure to strengthen the
credibility of an implicit threat to appeal the agency’s proposal. To the advantage of a firm that
makes such an expenditure, this upfront effort can result in the rulemaking context in two effects,
which represent the distinctive outcome of our model. First, it can deter the agency from
proposing a change to the status quo in the first place (a “chilling” effect). Second, when the
agency does initiate a proposed regulation, opposition expressed by a firm that actively lobbies
the agency can become compelling enough to lead the agency to withdraw or abandon its
proposal (a “retreating” effect).4
We use our model as a framework for empirically analyzing and explaining patterns of
regulatory policymaking at federal agencies. Drawing on data from agencies’ published
regulatory agendas as well as a new collection of data on agency withdrawals of proposed rules,
our empirical analysis indicates that business lobbying exhibits the types of intimidation
2

The American Antitrust Institute referred to Microsoft’s lobbying effort as an attempt to “leverage its position
through intimidation” (Foer 1999).
3
In addition to the U.S. examples in this paragraph, considerable evidence exists of similar lobbying effects in
Europe (e.g., Chalmers and Malik 2021).
4
Both of these effects—chilling and retreating—are broadly consistent with what others have sometimes referred to
as “negative lobbying” (McKay 2012). See also Butler and Miller (2021) for a recent empirical study of state-level
legislative lobbying where oppositional lobbying appears to chill the production of legislation.
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dynamics anticipated by our model.5 Specifically, we find that, in terms of the chilling effect,
agencies subjected to more business lobbying are less likely to propose new regulations and that
those regulations they do propose tend to involve relatively minor adjustments to the status quo.
We document these patterns both in terms of the number of proposals issued by agencies as well
as the number of announced plans for proposed rules that they later abandon before issuing any
proposal. Our model suggests a straightforward explanation for these findings: active lobbying
by business groups leads an agency to put greater weight on the possibility of adverse political
consequences, which manifests in less frequent and less stringent regulatory activity.
We also observe evidence of a retreating effect consistent with our model of intimidation. After
publishing a new proposal, an agency is more likely, ceteris paribus, to withdraw the proposal
when the agency receives opposing comments from business interests that have actively lobbied
the agency in a recent period. In our sample, the magnitude of the association between active
lobbying and the withdrawal of a proposed rule is substantial. When a business group simply
expresses opposition to a regulatory proposal during the public comment period for the proposal,
the likelihood that the agency withdraws its proposal is about five percent. But when a business
group not only submits a comment in opposition but also simultaneously lobbies the agency to
the maximum extent observed, the withdrawal probability increases to a near certainty.
Active lobbying can, of course, result in the transmission of policy information, but strikingly we
find no indication that longer comments (with presumably more policy information) affect the
likelihood of a retreating effect. Furthermore, the chilling effect we observe occurs early in the
process—even before agencies propose rules—when groups will necessarily have less ready
knowledge of the agency’s specific intentions and less ability to know what policy information is
likely to be of value to the agency. Yet, as highlighted in our model, this early time during the
rulemaking process—when the regulator must weigh whether to invest in developing and
pursuing a regulatory proposal—appears to be one when political information matters.
Together, the theory and empirical evidence we present emphasize the importance of active
interest group lobbying as a form of political information—and of implicit intimidation—as a
key mechanism of influence by interest groups opposed to policy change. The evidence
presented here also reveals a scope of business influence over regulation that is both clearer and
broader than existing empirical studies of the regulatory process have tended to show. Business
influence through intimidation—via the transmission of political information—appears both
more extensive than has been understood and more influential in shaping regulatory agencies’
agendas.

1 Business Groups and Regulatory Politics
It is well-documented that businesses are the most prevalent participants in regulatory
policymaking, as evidenced by behavior such as the formal submission of comments on
proposed rules (Coglianese 1996; Coglianese 2006; Yackee 2006a; Croley 2007). But with only
a few exceptions (e.g., Haeder and Yackee 2015; Yackee 2006a), existing empirical research on
5
Following other studies, we focus on business because it represents the most active, and potentially most
influential, set of groups participating in the regulatory process, and where we therefore might expect to observe
these intimidation effects. The theory could in principle apply to other types of interests as well.
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notice-and-commenting rulemaking has been relatively “inconclusive” about whether business
groups actually get the regulatory outcomes they want (Croley 2007:142; see also Kerwin,
Furlong, and West 2010; Kraft and Kamieniecki 2007).
A common strategy for detecting business influence in the rulemaking process has been to start
with a small sample of final regulations, taken essentially at random, and then to identify
changes appearing in these final rules compared with their corresponding proposed rules. The
comments received on the proposed rules are then compared with the changes appearing in the
final rule to see how frequently they match. Some studies show that business comments are more
frequently associated with changes tending to make rules less stringent (Yackee 2006a, 2006b;
Yackee and Yackee 2006), while other earlier work finds little if any meaningful change
associated with comments from business (West 2004; Golden 1998).
But substantive changes appearing in final rules are not the only, nor perhaps even the most
significant, outcomes for businesses that seek to influence regulatory policy. Consider how
businesses responded when the Minerals Management Service (MMS) of the Department of
Interior proposed a regulation on offshore drilling about a decade prior to the Deepwater Horizon
oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. Critics of MMS had long charged the agency with a close
relationship with the energy extraction industry it regulated, a charge made so persuasively after
the Deepwater Horizon spill in 2010 that Congress reorganized MMS and changed its name
(Carrigan 2013).
Yet long before the Gulf oil spill, in 2001, MMS published a notice of proposed rulemaking
(NPRM) titled “Procedures for Dealing With Sustained Casing Pressure.” This proposed rule
would have converted otherwise voluntary industry safety standards for offshore drilling into
mandatory government rules. The NPRM announced that MMS would take public comments on
the proposal over the course of three months, through early in 2002. But once that comment
period was over, rather than releasing a final rule, MMS instead formally withdrew its proposal
in 2003. Although the agency did not explicitly mention business opposition as the basis for its
withdrawal—at least in those precise terms—it is notable that 33 of the 34 comments submitted
on the 2001 proposal came from oil and gas companies or their representatives—including large
firms such as Exxon Mobil, BP, Shell, Chevron, and the American Petroleum Institute (API), the
major industry trade group. All of these written comments expressed opposition to the proposal.
An industry group called the Offshore Operators Committee (OOC) wrote the lengthiest
comment, which most firms signed onto and referenced in their own individual comments. OOC
called for the withdrawal of the proposal and recommended an industry-led strategy for dealing
with casing pressure as an alternative to new regulation. The other comments were significantly
shorter in length, typically between one and three pages, and they provided little additional
information except to inform the agency of the commenting organization’s support for OOC’s
position. For example, BP, the British-based oil and gas conglomerate that would later find itself
at the center of the Deepwater Horizon spill, wrote a one-page comment letter supporting OOC’s
comments as “a more effective method for reducing risk and improving safety.”
MMS’s withdrawn proposal offers at least three relevant insights about business influence on the
regulatory process. First, it shows that business opposition during the comment period can lead
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regulators not merely to make changes in the content of a final rule, but sometimes to make a full
withdrawal of a proposed rule—a retreat. This kind of influence—revealed by MMS’s own
announcement in withdrawing the proposed casing rule—remains inherently undetectable in
existing research focused on changes to the content of proposed rules that eventually become
final. That is because, with influence that leads to the retreating effect, there is no final rule for
researchers to study.
Second, the MMS example shows how firms can use the public comment process not just to
provide an agency with policy-relevant information about the substance of a rule, but also to
plant a flag in opposition to the agency’s proposal. The short letters submitted by BP and other
corporations in support of OOC’s comments provided the agency with little more than a political
signal of these firms’ opposition to the agency should it decide to go forward with its proposal.
Such political signals matter to officials in agencies who must navigate an institutional
environment in which they confront multiple principals. Moreover, political information may
matter more than policy information for regulators who, after all, possess their own policy
expertise (Epstein and O’Halloran 1999, cf. McCarty 2017). Regulators also have an ability to
acquire new policy information on their own (Gailmard and Patty 2012), such as via networks of
other federal and even state regulators (Yackee 2012), in-house experts (Sunstein 2016), or
through the use of surveys, commissioned studies, public hearings, and related methods
(Coglianese, Zeckhauser, and Parson 2004). Even when a regulatory agency might benefit from
policy information, firms may well be unable to communicate such information with much
credibility, given that they often have goals that differ from the agency’s (Breyer 1982, ch.5).
Finally, once we see that an agency can retreat in the face of business opposition by withdrawing
an already published regulatory proposal, the possibility emerges of a logically prior outcome in
the face of business opposition: an agency might never publish some proposed rules in the first
place—a chilling effect. Such an effect is akin to what researchers find more generally in terms
of interest groups influencing the very issues that appear on the agendas of policy decisionmakers (Kingdon 1984, Baumgartner and Jones 1993). Admittedly, discerning a chilling effect
over agency rules will be hard for anyone outside an agency to study because researchers rarely
observe the menu of potential proposed rules that a regulator could have pursued but never did
(cf. Naughton et al. 2009; Yackee 2013). Just as obviously, this chilling effect, like the retreating
effect, cannot be observed by studying final rules.
And yet, such hidden influence—a “second face” of power in the regulatory process (Bachrach
and Baratz 1962; Bachrach and Baratz 1963)—could be quite consequential. If the prospect of
business opposition has a large enough chilling effect on the production of regulatory proposals,
then the final rules that have been at the center of past studies might well tend to be ones that
already are more likely to be at least somewhat acceptable to business groups, notwithstanding
whatever changes such groups might eventually secure in the content of the final rule. The
upshot is that any influence that has been observed in studies focused on final rules could be only
part, and perhaps even only a small part, of the overall influence that business groups exert over
regulatory policy.
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2 Theory and Hypotheses
The theory of business influence through intimidation can be stated straightforwardly: Business
groups choose to approach a regulatory agency to signal their willingness and ability to appeal
the agency’s regulatory decisions to one or more of the agency’s principals, and the agency then
chooses how to respond to the signal it observes (Gordon and Hafer 2005).6 So stated, this
concise formulation of the intimidation theory raises the question, in the context of agency
rulemaking, of whether (or when) an agency will choose to respond to business pressure by
withdrawing a regulatory proposal, as MMS did in our example above, or by eschewing
regulation altogether, succumbing to the chilling effect also noted above. In this section, we
develop a signaling model of influence through intimidation that offers answers to this question,
which we elaborate in formal terms in Appendix A. We then use our model to develop
hypotheses for how intimidation should reveal itself empirically.
2.1 Model structure
Our signaling model comprises a two-player game, played between a regulatory agency (the
Agency) and a firm (the Firm) over a sequence that broadly tracks the federal notice-andcomment rulemaking process. The Agency has the formal authority to set policy by choosing
between the status quo, !, and two alternative policies " and ℎ, where " is a moderate regulation
and ℎ is a relatively “extreme” regulation that is the furthest from the status quo. We can think of
the status quo as the “low” regulation policy, with the Agency contemplating alternative
regulations that would increase the stringency or burden relative to the status quo. The Agency’s
ability to set its agenda reflects both the fact that agencies possess a high degree of discretion
over their own regulatory agendas (West and Raso 2013) and the fact that the relevant principals
(e.g., Congress, the White House Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, and the courts)
typically limit themselves to playing a reactive role vis-à-vis the Agency (Potter 2019).7 In terms
of the Agency’s preferences, we focus our analysis on the case where the Agency prefers the
alternatives " and ℎ to the status quo.
We assume that both actors—the Agency and the Firm—operate under some uncertainty about
the other’s preferences. The Firm is uncertain about whether the Agency prefers " or ℎ, and the
Agency is uncertain about whether the Firm prefers ! or ". (We assume that the Firm is never
extreme in its preferences, so that ! or m is always preferable to ℎ, which reflects a tendency for
firms to prefer incremental policy change, if any change at all (Drutman 2015:73).) We refer to
the type of Firm that prefers ! as a low-regulation firm and the type of Firm that prefers " as a
6

Our focus in this article is on business groups, although we see no reason why the basic dynamics highlighted by
the model and empirical evidence presented here would not apply to other types of interest groups involved in the
regulatory process, such as public advocacy groups that oppose attempts at deregulation.
7
As a general rule, the courts step in only after an agency has acted and can either block those actions or remand
them to the agency. Similarly with the OIRA review process, the White House can delay or block, but generally
OIRA does not initiate regulations (West and Raso 2013, p.511). Likewise, once an agency possesses authority to
regulate, Congress is largely limited to increasing oversight hearings or decreasing agency budgets (Acs 2019). We
do recognize, of course, that sometimes courts can interpret statutes to compel agencies to issue new regulations and
that Presidents can issue executive orders to prompt agencies to initiate rulemaking proceedings. The general
structure of the federal regulatory process, though, means that, on a day-to-day basis, oversight institutions such as
courts, Congress, and the White House find themselves in a reactive posture responding to agencies’ initiatives.
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moderate-regulation firm. Likewise, we refer to the type of Agency that prefers " as a
moderate-regulation agency and the type of Agency that prefers ℎ as a high-regulation agency.
The prior probability that the Firm is a moderate-regulation type is %, and the prior probability
that the Agency is a high-regulation type is &. Thus, the probability that the Firm and Agency
have the same preferences over regulation is %(1 − &).
The Firm has three tools at its disposal that it can use to shape the outcome the Agency adopts:
(i) comment on a proposed regulation by the Agency, should it issue one;
(ii) lobby the Agency, either before or after the Agency issues a proposed regulation; and
(iii) appeal the Agency’s proposed regulation and spark an intervention from the
Agency’s principals.
The comment tool is a “cheap talk” message of support or opposition, as it is free to send.8 By
contrast, the lobbying tool is a costly message because it entails an expenditure of resources
(Austen-Smith and Banks 2000).9 And in our model, the appeal tool is the key source of
influence because a successful appeal can override the Agency’s outcome. Each of these three
tools manifests in our model as a binary decision: the firm decides to deploy it, or not.
Based on a number of recent studies, we assume that an appeal from interest groups could lead to
a reaction from Congress (Hall and Miler 2008; Ritchie and You 2019), the White House
(Haeder and Yackee 2015), the courts (Revesz 1997; McGarity 2012), or some combination of
the three. In our model, an appeal has the effect of blocking the Agency’s proposal, imposing a
reputational cost, +, on the Agency, and reverting the policy back to the status quo.
In addition to uncertainty about the Firm’s preferences, the Agency is also uncertain about the
Firm’s cost to mount a successful appeal, which can be either low or high (“low-cost” or “highcost”). The Agency’s prior belief is that the Firm’s appeal cost (k) is low with probability , and
high with probability 1 − ,. This additional uncertainty about the Firm’s appeal cost, when
combined with the uncertainty about the Firm’s preferences, yields a total of four types of firms:
a low-regulation, low-cost firm; a low-regulation, high-cost firm; a moderate-regulation, lowcost firm; and a moderate-regulation, high-cost firm. Each type has a prior probability of %,,
%(1 − ,), (1 − %),, and (1 − %)(1 − ,), respectively.
We focus our analysis on a set of parameter values according to which the four firm types vary in
their willingness to pay for an appeal. This willingness is a function of the costs each firm type
would face in appealing as well as the payoffs it receives from different levels of regulation. The
low-regulation, low-cost firm will appeal if the Agency proposes any change to the status quo
(either " or ℎ); the low-regulation, high-cost firm will only appeal if the Agency proposes ℎ; the
8

For a different perspective on comments, in a model in which they are assumed to be truthful, see Libgober (2019).
The cost to lobby may be small, in practice, relative to the revenues of a firm. Nonetheless, the logic in our model
applies because lobbying is not cost-free. Decision-makers within any company’s government or regulatory affairs
office need to think strategically about how to allocate their limited time and budgets. For example, it will be
rational for them to eschew lobbying in cases where it is unlikely to have any impact.
9
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moderate-regulation, low-cost firm will also appeal only if the Agency proposes ℎ; and, finally,
the moderate-regulation, high-cost firm will never appeal. Table 1 summarizes these details for
each firm and agency type.
Table 1: Player types and preferences
Firm type
Low-regulation, low-cost
Low-regulation, high-cost
Moderate-regulation, low-cost
Moderate-regulation, high-cost

Preference ranking
!>">ℎ
!>">ℎ
">!>ℎ
">!>ℎ

Agency type
Moderate-regulation
High-regulation

Preference ranking
">!>ℎ
ℎ>">!

Policies firm will appeal*
", ℎ
ℎ
ℎ
−

*

The policies the firm will appeal are determined by each type’s appeal cost and its payoffs from the policy and the
status quo. Further detail is provided in Appendix A.

The sequence of the game closely follows the steps in the notice-and-comment rulemaking
process. The game unfolds as follows:
1. The Firm makes the binary decision of whether to pay cost, /, to lobby the Agency. (We
refer to this as pre-proposal lobbying.)
2. The Agency decides whether to pay 0, its costs to propose a change to the status quo.
(The game ends at this step if the Agency declines to make a proposal.)
3. The Firm submits either a supportive or oppositional comment on the Agency’s proposal
and makes another binary decision whether to pay / to lobby the Agency. (We refer to
this as post-proposal lobbying, which is distinct from commenting.).
4. The Agency decides whether to keep the proposal, revise it, or withdraw it. (If the
Agency withdraws the proposal, the game ends.)
5. If the Agency keeps or revises the proposal, the Firm decides whether to pay 1 > / to
appeal, which would block the Agency’s proposal, reverting the policy back to the status
quo and imposing the cost + on the Agency.
Given our set-up, we have limited the Firm’s influence over the Agency to a mechanism that
depends largely on political intimidation (Gordon and Hafer 2005; Dal Bo and Di Tella 2003). In
doing so, we assume that the Firm has no option available to use policy information to influence
the Agency. We make this assumption not because we think that policy information does not
matter but instead because we aim to investigate another modality of influence, notably what we
have earlier called political information. In the model, the Firm provides political information
either explicitly by submitting a comment supportive or oppositional to the Agency’s proposal or
by lobbying either before an agency decides whether to issue a proposal or after it issues one.
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To focus even more explicitly on the role that political information may have in regulatory
policymaking, we structure the game with two additional restrictions on the strategies available
to the Firm. The first restriction, as alluded to already, is that the Firm cannot send any message
about its policy preferences until the Agency makes its proposal, at which point the Firm can
convey those preferences by submitting a comment. This restriction reflects the reality that
outside groups that have not yet seen the specifics of a regulator’s proposal will necessarily be
limited in what message they can send about the proposal’s details.10
As a second additional restriction, we limit the Firm to a single investment decision in lobbying
either before the proposal is public (i.e., pre-proposal lobbying) or after it is announced (i.e.,
post-proposal lobbying). Although this restriction has little impact on the results that follow, it
allows us to focus on the tradeoff between lobbying the Agency early, to stave off or chill
regulatory plans, versus waiting to learn exactly what the Agency will propose before attempting
to influence the Agency, such as by convincing it to retreat.
2.2 Implications
Before turning to our analysis of the full model, we introduce its basic structure by assuming
complete information on the part of both players, the Firm and the Agency. We then turn to an
explication of the model in full, in which play occurs under incomplete information, and present
our hypotheses that follow from the model.
2.2.1 Complete information benchmark
We consider first a simple benchmark case where the Agency, whether a high-regulation or
moderate-regulation type, knows the exact type of Firm it is playing against. With perfect
knowledge about the Firm’s type, the Agency will simply respond according to the type of Firm
it confronts, proposing a policy as close to its ideal policy as it can without triggering an appeal.
To illustrate, imagine a case in which the Agency is a high-regulation type. If it confronts a Firm
of the low-regulation, low-cost type, the Agency knows that it is facing a potentially threatening
Firm—one that would appeal any change to the status quo. Consequently, the Agency will not
propose a new policy.
On the other hand, if the Agency confronts a Firm of the low-regulation, high-cost type, the
Agency will not choose its most preferred policy, h, but instead will choose policy m. Choosing
m will forestall an appeal because, as discussed, the low-regulation, low-cost firm’s cost of
appealing outweighs the benefit it would get from changing m to l.
Similarly, the Agency will also choose m when it confronts a Firm of the moderate-regulation,
low-cost type, as " is the policy that would forestall an appeal from this type of firm. But if the
10

In addition, this restriction allows us to explore whether business groups can be influential before the agency
solicits comments on a specific proposal in ways that do not signal their policy preferences on that proposal. For
example, business groups may be able to convey information to regulators even when their expenditures for
lobbying purchase little more than opportunities for “maintaining contact” with an agency (Baumgartner et al. 2009,
p.154).
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Agency confronts a moderate-regulation, high-cost firm, the Agency will choose h, its ideal
policy, since the Agency knows that this type of firm’s cost of appeal outweighs the benefit it
would get from changing h to l.
We can see that, in the first of these scenarios, the Agency succumbs to what could be
considered a chilling effect. When it knows that the Firm is a low-regulation, low-cost type, the
Agency simply does not even propose any change to the status quo. In the next two scenarios,
although the Agency will propose m, which falls short of its ideal policy, there is technically no
retreating effect. That is because the Agency knows the Firm’s type and thus has no incentive to
float a trial balloon by proposing a policy from which it later backs away.
Note also that, under complete information, the Firm—no matter its type—has no incentive to lobby
the Agency because the Agency adapts or chooses its policy based on its knowledge of the Firm’s
type. We next turn to relaxing the assumption of complete information to show how the Agency’s
uncertainty about the Firm’s type is what gives the Firm an incentive to lobby. The Agency gathers
information about the Firm’s type based on the decisions it observes the Firm to make.
2.2.2 Full model (with incomplete information)
Turning now to the full model, we remove the simplifying assumption that the Agency knows at
the outset the type of Firm it confronts. We find that, under uncertainty, the Firm can induce both
a chilling effect and a retreating effect. Precisely when these effects occur will depend on two
key parameters of the model, % (probability that the Firm prefers moderate regulation) and ,
(probability the Firm has a low cost of appeal). Figure 1 plots where we expect to see the two
effects as a function of these parameters, as shown in the proofs in Appendix A.
Figure 1 focuses attention on an interval in the parameter space (, ∈ [,4 (0), ,̅ ] ) in which lowregulation firms have an incentive to lobby early to stop the Agency from regulating before it has
spent s, the cost of creating a proposed regulation. That cost to the Agency creates the incentive for
early lobbying; if 0 were 0, the interval would disappear and low-regulation firms would see no
advantage to lobbying early. We explain and justify further our focus on this interval in Appendix A.
With reference to Figure 1, we explain the chilling effect equilibrium and draw empirical
implications, and then we do the same for the retreating effect. We begin with Proposition 1,
which states formally the conditions for the chilling effect.
Proposition 1 For , ∈ [,4(0), ,̅] and % < %
8 (,), there exists a chilling equilibrium
where both low-regulation types (i.e., low-cost or high-cost) lobby early. The Agency
responds to early lobbying by maintaining the status quo (a chilling effect). The
moderate-regulation types eschew lobbying early, and they either separate, with the lowcost type lobbying later (when , < ,9), or they pool and neither type lobbies at all (when
, ≥ ,9). The Agency responds to the absence of early lobbying by making a proposal of
either h or m depending on the Agency’s type and ,.
In the chilling effect equilibrium, which is located in the region below the curve in Figure 1, only the lowregulation firms—whether high-cost or low-cost—lobby the Agency early, and the Agency declines to
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regulate when it sees this happen. The moderate-regulation firms do not lobby early and the Agency,
when it observes no early lobbying, proposes a new policy, " or ℎ, depending on its preferences.
Critical to the chilling effect is the unique incentive that the low-regulation firms have to lobby
early.11 By selecting the lobby-early strategy, both types of low-regulation firms (low- and highcost) have more leverage to block the Agency’s proposal than they would have if they waited
until the Agency developed its proposal. This is intuitive given that the Agency must pay s to
develop its proposal, but it can, for free, either revise the proposal (i.e., change it from h to m) or
withdraw it altogether.
One question that emerges is why, in the chilling effect region, the Agency eschews regulating
after observing early lobbying, given that not all types of firms that lobby early are actually
threatening. After all, as we see in the complete information version of the model, only the lowregulation, low-cost firm will appeal when the Agency chooses ". Here, with incomplete
information, the Agency’s cautious behavior is sustained by its prior belief that the Firm is likely
to be threatening, as determined by % and ,. This belief, which is common knowledge,
encourages both types of low-regulation firms to pool and play the same strategy. Because the
Agency cannot distinguish between the two types of firms, the Agency capitulates and behaves
as though any early lobbying brings with it the same threat of appeal.
Figure 1: Equilibrium Regions
✓ˆ

✓(s)
Mod. Reg.
Firm
More Likely

✓¯

Retreating E↵ect Region:
Low-regulation firms separate:

RETREATING

- Low-cost type lobbies post proposal

EFFECT

- High-cost type does not lobby

REGION

Moderate-regulation firms pool:
- Neither cost type lobbies

Agency’s
Prior Belief
About Firm’s
Preference (⇡)

Moderate-regulation firms separate:
- Low-cost type lobbies post proposal
- High-cost type does not lobby
CHILLING

Chilling E↵ect Region:

EFFECT
Low Reg.
Firm
More Likely

REGION

Low-regulation firms pool:
- Both cost types lobby early
Moderate-regulation firms pool:

High Appeal
Cost Firm
More Likely

Low Appeal
Cost Firm
More Likely

- Neither cost type lobbies
Moderate-regulation firms separate:
- Low-cost type lobbies post proposal

Agency’s
Prior Belief
About Firm’s
Appeal Cost (✓)

- High-cost type does not lobby

Note: The figure assumes the following values for the other parameters in the model: ! = .45, ( = .05, * = .3, , = .3, - = .2.
See Appendix A for more details on the numeric payoffs for each player.

Unlike the low-regulation firms, which always oppose the Agency’s preferred policy (! or ℎ), the moderateregulation firms face a tradeoff if they lobby early: with probability 1 − % the Agency prefers the same policy that
they do (that is, policy !), in which case spending resources to lobby the Agency is wasteful. We provide a further
analysis of these tradeoffs in Appendix A.
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The chilling effect equilibrium—the region within which the Agency is most susceptible to
intimidation from early lobbying—is shaped by several key parameters. Chilling occurs where
the probability of the low-regulation firm is sufficiently high (when % is relatively small) and
where the probability of the low-cost firm is also sufficiently high (when , is relatively large).
Furthermore, the scope of the chilling effect is shaped by the Agency’s cost of developing a
proposal, s, which determines the low-regulation firms’ incentive to lobby early (as opposed to
lobbying later). This is reflected in Figure 1 by the interval from ,4(0) to ,̅.12 As s increases, the
size of the interval increases, and, as discussed above, if s moves to zero the size of the interval
shrinks to zero (i.e., ,4(0) = ,̅ when s = 0), eliminating at that point any advantage from early
lobbying.
The chilling effect forms the basis of our first hypothesis. Regulatory agencies that are subjected
to early business lobbying should issue fewer proposals, especially those proposals that have a
large startup cost.
Hypothesis 1 (H1) Early business lobbying at an agency is associated with fewer
subsequent regulatory proposals by that agency, especially those proposals that require
the agency to make a large upfront investment.
The chilling effect results in a clearly ideal outcome for low-regulation firms since, regardless of
their cost of appeal (low-cost or high-cost), they prefer that the Agency not regulate at all. If
firms can chill the Agency, they keep it from issuing any proposal to change the status quo.
For moderate-regulation firms, however, this is not the case since they would like the Agency to
change the status quo, albeit only to the moderate policy, ". Under certain conditions, the
moderate-regulation types would have an incentive to undermine the chilling effect by also
threatening to lobby early—a prospect that would limit the extent to which early lobbying is
informative about the Firm’s type. Indeed, the more types of Firms that lobby early, the less
informative early lobbying is for the Agency.
What happens, however, is that the moderate-regulation firms never actually have to act on a
threat to lobby early. The credibility of the threat is sufficient to undermine the chilling effect
equilibrium. In its place, a new equilibrium emerges where the Agency always proposes a
change to the status quo and the only lobbying that occurs does so later, post-proposal. This new
equilibrium makes up the retreating effect region that sits above the curve in Figure 1.
The retreating effect can be characterized formally by the following proposition:
Proposition 2 For , ∈ [,4(0), ,̅] and % ≥ %
8 (,), there exists a retreating equilibrium
where lobbying only occurs post-proposal, if at all. The Agency always proposes a
change to the status quo, either m or h, depending on the Agency’s type. The two types of
low-regulation firms separate and only the low-cost type lobbies. The Agency responds to
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In the region to the left of &' and to the right of &̅ the low-regulation firms are indifferent about when they lobby.
We discuss this further in Appendix A.
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this lobbying by withdrawing its proposal (a retreating effect). The moderate-regulation
firms either separate or pool depending on , and the Agency responds by keeping its
proposal (or at most, revising it from h to m), but never retreating.
In the retreating effect equilibrium, which is located in the region above the curve in Figure
1, the two types of low-regulation firms always separate and play different strategies. Of the
two low-regulation types, only the low-cost type will choose to lobby.13 Since this type is
willing to pay to appeal any change to the status quo (see Table 1), the Agency always
withdraws its proposal when it learns that it is playing against this type. In other words, the
Agency retreats.
In some cases, though, the moderate-regulation, low-cost firm type will also have an incentive to
lobby. When the Agency has proposed a high level of regulation (h), the moderate-regulation,
low-cost firm uses lobbying to distinguish itself from the moderate-regulation, high-cost type.
But it still needs to distinguish itself from the low-regulation, low-cost firm type, which (as just
noted) will also be lobbying after the agency issues its proposal. The opportunity to submit
comments on the proposal provides the vehicle for firms to distinguish themselves. Consider the
white region above the curve Figure 1, where , < ,9. In this region, the moderate-regulation,
low-cost firm sends a different comment from the low-regulation, low-cost firm (i.e., the latter
sends an oppositional one, while the former sends a supportive one).
The low-regulation, low-cost firm’s combination of an oppositional comment with post-proposal
lobbying is sufficient to let the agency know its type. Knowing its type, and thus its ability and
willingness to appeal, the Agency retreats (see Table 1). This forms the basis of our second
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2 (H2) An agency is more likely to retreat—that is, withdraw a proposed
rule—when confronted with business opposition signaled by the combination of postproposal lobbying and the filing of an oppositional comment.
Together, H1 and H2 reflect an expectation that firms can influence by intimidation.14 That is,
simply by sending political signals—namely, the mere expenditure on lobbying or the
combination of this expenditure and the filing of a comment—firms can either forestall or turn
back regulatory proposals, irrespective of the communication of any policy information.
According to H1, the expectation is that agencies will succumb to the chilling effect in the face
of businesses’ early lobbying and will issue fewer regulations, especially fewer regulations that
are especially costly for agencies to develop. Under H2, the expectation is that an increase in
lobbying expenditures combined with oppositional business commenting will be associated with
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The incentive here is to lobby at all, whether early or post-proposal. As developed in Appendix A, the low-cost
firm in the retreating equilibrium would be indifferent as to the timing of its lobbying.
14
We state our hypotheses in statistical terms (e.g., “more likely”) even though our model has the stark prediction
that post-proposal lobbying combined with an oppositional comment always leads to a withdrawal. Obviously there
are other factors beyond intimidation that will, in practice, influence patterns of regulatory chilling or retreating.
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the retreating effect in the form of agencies’ withdrawal of proposed rules. We now turn to our
empirical effort to assess these expectations.

3 Empirical Strategy
Using data generated by the notice-and-comment rulemaking process, as well as the lobbying
expenditures of business groups—including firms, trade associations, and their hired lobbyists—
we evaluate the implications of our model empirically.
We start with the acknowledgement that business opposition to regulatory activity is not the only
factor shaping regulatory decision-making. Critically, policy outcomes that may appear to be
driven by pressure from business, in part because it serves their interests, may instead by shaped
by the political environment (Carpenter 2013). For this reason, we divide the periods we study
into distinct political regimes in which the partisan environment is largely constant—periods
during which there was no change in party control of either chamber of Congress or the White
House. Restricting our analysis in this way allows us to factor out regulatory changes that might
have been prompted or sanctioned by shifting electoral politics and the partisanship of those
overseeing the regulator (Acs 2019; O’Connell 2011). Within each stable regime, we limit our
analysis to those regulatory proposals that were initiated and withdrawn (or finalized) within the
same regime.
The first part of our empirical strategy—namely, investigating H1—uses aggregate data across the
universe of regulatory activity to identify the relationship between lobbying and the publication of
proposed rules. The second part looks to agency announcements withdrawing proposed rules to
investigate H2. Because within-regime withdrawals are infrequent, this second part of our
empirical strategy uses a case-control approach, a methodology for studying rare events that are
likely to be missed in a random sample of events (King and Zeng 2001). Our research design in
this part selects on the dependent variables by comparing the universe of proposals that were
withdrawn (<! = 1) to a random sample of proposals that were not withdrawn (<! = 0) but
were otherwise similar on a number of key characteristics, including the partisan environment in
which they were initiated. For each proposal ?, we collect the public comments submitted by
business interests and identify whether they express opposition to the proposal.
Throughout, we focus on lobbying in the form of reported lobbying expenditures that target
specific agencies.15 In our analysis of the chilling effect, we look specifically at lobbying that
occurs before the publication of a given proposal—that is, before the content of the proposal is
made public. These “lagged” expenditures are consistent with the equilibrium in our theoretical
model and thus can provide a window into the intimidation-based mechanism of influence. Finally,
we make use of a variety of fixed effect specifications to account for additional variation, notably
across agencies, time, and the matched groups that we use in our case-control analysis.

15
We do not expect that an agency would necessarily be aware of the precise lobbying expenditures that we include in
our empirical analysis. Rather, an agency experiences the lobbying firsthand, and our measures are proxies for what the
agency experiences.
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3.1 Data
We rely on data on the following three main features of the regulatory game from our theoretical
model:
Regulatory proposals and regimes. We track proposals using data from the Federal Register and
the semi-annual Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions. For the
reasons noted above, we limit our analysis to three regimes: (i) the 110th Congress; (ii) the 111th
Congress; and (iii) the 112th to 113th Congress. We aggregate activity to the agency-quarter
level, where an agency is the smallest organizational unit we can identify in both the Agenda and
the lobbying data (described next).16 Appendix B provides further details and a list of all the
proposals used in our case-control analysis.
Lobbying and other political expenditures. We linked each business group that commented to its
federal lobbying activity, as given by the federal disclosure reports collected by the Center for
Responsive Politics (CRP). For consistency with the regulatory data, we aggregate the reports at
the quarterly level (since 2008 they have been filed quarterly). For each report, we identify the
entities lobbied (e.g., House, Senate, or agencies) and split the total expenditure evenly across
each entity. Appendix B includes further details about the lobbying data we rely upon for our
analysis presented here. In Appendix C, we discuss alternative measures of lobbying used in our
replication analysis, such as the total amount listed on each report as well as the total number of
reports.
Public comments. We collected the public comments from business groups associated with each
proposal in our case-control study and coded them for whether a commenter expressed complete
opposition to the proposal, such as asking for it to be withdrawn. Appendix B provides more
detail on the coding decisions, including examples.
Summary statistics on each of these three sources of data are provided in Appendix B.
3.2 Analysis
Our empirical analysis proceeds in two parts. We look first for evidence of a chilling effect
associated with early lobbying (H1), that is, influence-seeking efforts that occur before a
proposed rule is published. Then we look for evidence of retreating effects, where lobbying
combined with a stated opposition to a proposed rule leads to the proposal’s withdrawal (H2).
3.2.1 Chilling Effects
H1 states that early lobbying should be associated with fewer regulatory proposals. To
investigate, we constructed a balanced panel of regulatory activity and lobbying activity across
69 agencies and 7 years, from 2008 to 2014, using only the within-regime regulatory proposals,
as defined above. Our first dependent variable, @"# , is the number of proposals issued (i.e.,
notices of proposed rulemakings, or NPRMs, published in the Federal Register) by agency A in
16

Our analysis starts in 2008, because this is first year in which interest groups filed quarterly lobbying reports.

16

quarter B. Our main explanatory variable, Lobby Expenditure, is the amount of lobbying activity
at agency A in the quarters leading up to quarter B (i.e., B − 1, B − 2, etc.). We measure the
business lobbying activity by aggregating all of the reported expenditures in the lobbying reports
that mention agency A for each of these time periods. When lobbying increases in a prior quarter,
such as in quarter B − 1, we expect agency A to issue fewer proposals in quarter B. Moreoever,
any proposals that are issued should require a smaller upfront investment, i.e., they should be
easier for the agency to develop, as hypothesized in H1. Because our dependent variable is a
count of the number of proposals, we explore these dynamics using a Poisson model with a
correction for overdispersion.17
The results are shown in the first four columns of Table 2. Overall, the results are consistent with
our theory of intimidation and our expectation that lobbying should chill (rather than stimulate)
the amount of regulatory activity. Column 4, for example, suggests that a standard deviation
increase in the lobbying expenditure at an agency in quarter B − 1 is associated with over a 25
percent decrease in the number of proposals published at quarter B, holding the other variables
constant at their mean value. We find an attenuated relationship with earlier lobbying (B − 2,
and prior), which is intuitive on the assumption that more recent lobbying sends a stronger signal
to the agency.18
Table 2: Chilling Effects

We also find evidence indicating that this chilling effect extends to agencies avoiding proposals
that, all else equal, require a more substantial upfront investment, as suggested by H1. We lack a
perfect measure of the investment agencies need to develop proposals, although we can identify
17
The use of a Poisson model also enables, through the use of an offset, our modeling of the rate of significant
proposed rules to total proposed rules. For a discussion of an offset in a Poisson model and the inclusion of an
overdispersion parameter, see Gelman and Hill (2007:112-115).
18
In column 4, we find a greater effect for recent lobbying in quarter ) – 1 than contemporaneous lobbying in
quarter t, which may simply reflect the fact that a measure of lobbying activity that takes place in the quarter within
which the proposal is published will be a noisier measure of early lobbying.
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those proposals that agencies list in the Unified Agenda as “economically significant” or
“significant” (as opposed to “substantive, but not significant”).19 If these significant proposals are
more complex policies, as their longer page lengths suggest, they should require a larger upfront
investment by the agency to develop. We denote the number of such proposals as @D"# , where
@D"# ≤ @"# . Columns 5 and 6 show that an increase in lobbying in quarter B − 1 is associated
with agencies issuing fewer significant proposals in quarter B. Column 5 shows that the total
number of such higher-investment proposals decreases with prior lobbying, and column 6 shows
that the proportion of proposals that are higher-investment decreases with prior lobbying, i.e.,
$%

that $!" decreases when @"# is used as an offset in the Poisson model.
!"

In addition to investigating whether lobbying is associated with fewer new proposals, we also
consider whether it is associated with agencies dropping planned regulatory proposals. We are able
to discern which regulatory initiatives were planned, even before they were issued as published
NPRMs, because agencies announce planned NPRMs in the Unified Agenda. Here, we look
specifically at whether agencies are more likely to drop a planned NPRM when early lobbying
increases. We use the same lobbying data from the previous analysis, and we replace the dependent
variable @"# with a measure for the number of planned regulatory initiatives that were dropped by
each agency, F"# .20 Consistent with the chilling effect, the results shown in the last four columns of
Table 2 show that prior lobbying is associated with an increase in these dropped plans, where prior
is defined as one or both of the previous two quarters, B − 1 and B − 2.
We also find that the association between lobbying and decreased regulatory activity declines
with time. That is, when we include multiple lags of lobbying expenditures, only the most recent
lag, lobbying in quarter B − 1, remains statistically significant. This is not surprising given that,
in reality, information tends to grow stale over time. A regulatory agency’s agenda can change,
and so can firms’ managers and their competitive environments. As time goes on, older lobbying
will necessarily reveal less information to the agency about the firm’s current type vis-à-vis the
agency’s current agenda—the very information needed for a chilling effect to occur, as indicated
in our model.
3.2.2 Retreating Effects
We also find evidence of retreating effects. Business opposition to specific published proposals
is associated with their withdrawal and these effects are most pronounced when the oppositional
group also lobbies the relevant agency (see H2). We identify these effects using the case-control
approach noted above, which we briefly elaborate here before turning to the results.
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Appendix B provides more detail on these categories.
In the Unified Agenda, these dropped plans are listed as having been “withdrawn.” Even though an NPRM has not
yet been published, the dropped plans resemble, in a way, the withdrawn NPRMs that we analyze in the next
section. But dropped plans should be distinguished from what we call withdrawals in the next section because they
are announced at a much earlier stage in the regulatory process. Unlike with NPRMs, the public notices associated
with the regulatory plans that are dropped are extremely cursory, providing no details about what the agency plans to
propose in an NPRM and thus staking out little ground from which the agency might retreat. Furthermore, because
these plans are announced at such an early stage, agencies provide no invitation for the filing of comments on such
plans.
20
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To set up the case control approach, we identified the universe of withdrawn proposals in our
within-regime data and matched each withdrawal to a comparable sample of “control” proposals
that were not withdrawn. For each withdrawn proposal, we randomly selected as many as three
proposals that were identical to it in terms of four characteristics: (i) the agency making the
proposal; (ii) the political regime in which the NPRM was published; (iii) the title of the U.S.
Code that the proposal implements; and (iv) the degree of the proposal’s significance as
designated by the agency in the Unified Agenda. We found at least one match for 20 of the
withdrawals, resulting in a matched sample of 51 non-withdrawn proposals and a total sample
size of 71 proposals.
Based on our matching criteria, then, each proposal belongs to a grouping, where all proposals
within the same grouping are identical on each of the four factors just listed. We have fourteen
groupings, each with between one to three withdrawn proposals and one to nine matched
proposals that were not withdrawn.21 Within each grouping, each proposal will be from the same
agency, political regime, part of the U.S. Code, and level of designated significance. In the
analysis that follows, we use the grouping indicators as fixed effects, which allows us to identify
the factors associated with withdrawals based on within-grouping variation.
For each proposal in the analysis, we also collected and coded the relevant public comments
from business organizations. Using a team of research assistants, we identified 386 business
comments associated with the 71 proposals and used a binary coding scheme to classify each
comment as either supporting or opposing the proposal. We first analyze these data using the
comments as the unit of analysis, and then we use the proposals as the unit of analysis.
Comment-level Analysis. We start with an analysis using comments as the unit of analysis.
Comments are nested within proposals, which are in turn nested within groupings.22 The
relationship of interest is
Pr(<! = 1) = IJK?B &' (& + M' NOOJ0P!( + M) IJQQRSTOPUV?BW+P!( +
M* NOOJ0P!( × IJQQRSTOPUV?BW+P!( +
M+ YJ""PUBIPUKBℎ!( + M, ZW"YJ""PUB0! ),

(2)

where ? indexes each proposal, / indexes each commenter, and & is a fixed effect for each grouping.
Here, the dependent variable, <! , is an indicator for whether the proposal is withdrawn. The
variable Lobby Expenditure is now the logged lobbying expenditure by each commenter targeting
the agency that issued proposal ? around the time in which the proposal was published.23 The
variable Oppose takes a value of 1 if commenter / expressed opposition to ? and a value of 0
otherwise. We control for the page length of each comment using the variable Comment Length. We
also control for the total number of business comments filed for each proposal using the variable
Number of Comments. We clustered the standard errors at the level of each proposal.
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In no instance was the number of withdrawn rules within a grouping greater than the number of non-withdrawn
rules. Appendix B includes a full list of the 71 proposals used in the case-control study.
22
The comment-level data reduces our sample from 71 proposals to 49 since we lose cases where no business
comments were filed.
23
We limit this time to include the quarter in which the NPRM was published plus the subsequent three quarters.
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The results from estimating Equation 2 are shown in Table 3.24 Across all four models, we find
that an oppositional comment is positively associated with an increased withdrawal probability
and that the magnitude of this effect increases with the commenter’s lobbying (i.e., M) + M* >
0). The magnitude of this effect is also substantial. For example, the predicted probability that
Table 3: Retreating Effects (Comment-level Analysis, Logit Model)

24
In Appendix C, we show that the models yield similar results when the lobbying expenditure is measured using
the total amount listed on each lobbying report (i.e., not splitting the expenditure by the number of entities on each
report). We also show similar results in Appendix C from a related model that aggregates the variables used in
Equation 2 to the level of the proposal. This alternative model shows that the total amount of lobbying expenditures
by groups that file oppositional comments has a strong, positive association with the probability of withdrawal (N =
49, p < .01).
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proposal ? is withdrawn after an oppositional comment from a group that did not lobby is just
under 0.05. But even a modest increase in lobbying from such an oppositional group, as
measured by the average lobbying expenditure in our data, is associated with a withdrawal
probability of 0.42. A large increase in lobbying, as measured by the maximum lobbying
expenditure in our data, is associated with a nearly certain likelihood of withdrawal.25
The effect of lobbying, however, does not appear to be without limits. For one, the amount spent
lobbying other agencies does not appear to matter. We find this in Model 2, which re-estimates
Equation 1 controlling for the amount each commenter spent lobbying all regulatory agencies
around the period in which the NPRM was issued (the quarter of its publication plus the
following three quarters). The main results are unchanged and the aggregate expenditure has no
association with the likelihood of withdrawal.
In addition, as with the diminishing association over time between lobbying and chilling, older
lobbying appears to matter less for agency retreating than does lobbying that is more
contemporaneous to the issuance of a proposal. When we re-estimated Equation 2 using earlier
lobbying expenditures at the agency (four quarters prior to the publication of the NPRM), the
positive association between lobbying and retreating shown in Table 3 disappeared (see
Appendix Table 12).
Our empirical setup can also be used to probe two alternative mechanisms of influence that
might drive results. One is the possibility that a firm’s influence actually derives from its overall
lobbying before Congress, so the only reason that lobbying an agency appears influential, as it
does in Model 1, is because lobbying an agency is correlated with lobbying Congress. However,
when we include a measure for how much each commenter spends lobbying Congress we find
that it has no association with the likelihood of withdrawal (see Model 3).
Another possibility is that agency lobbying is correlated with a firm’s level of spending on
campaign contributions, and that a firm’s influence actually comes from its overall strength in
purchasing favors from Congress (Grossman and Helpman 2002) or from its demonstration of
political “muscle-flexing” through PAC spending (Gordon and Hafer 2005). However, when we
include a measure for how much each commenter spent on campaign contributions in the most
recent election cycle, we find no relationship to the probability of withdrawal (see Model 4).26
Together, these results suggest that PAC contributions and lobbying Congress—while plausible
signals of a firm’s commitment to influence-seeking activity (Gordon and Hafer 2005)—may
communicate little information about a firm’s willingness and capacity to appeal a given
regulatory proposal. This conclusion is broadly consistent with our theoretical model, where part
of what makes lobbying informative (and consequently influential) is the fact that the Firm bases
its lobbying decision on expectations about the Agency’s regulatory plans and then accordingly
targets its lobbying at the Agency. We should expect that the effect of lobbying expenditures in

25
The predicted probabilities we report use a correction that is standard in case-control studies to estimate the
intercept, as suggested by King and Zeng (2001). See Appendix C for details.
26
Part 4 of Appendix B details how we collected our PAC spending data.
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intimidating an agency will depend on when they are spent and how clearly they are targeted at
an agency.27
Proposal-level Analysis. Until now, we have treated the comments submitted by individual
business interests as the unit of analysis. However, as would be expected—and as appeared in
the MMS example in Section 1—firms may also form coalitions in their efforts to influence
through intimidation. To investigate the effect such coalitional behavior may have on agencies’
behavior, we now turn to an analysis of how different alignments of business groups may be
associated with the probability of withdrawal. Specifically, we analyze whether unified
opposition by business groups is associated with a higher likelihood of a withdrawal than when
business groups are divided in their positions on a regulatory proposal.
To do so, we constructed a dataset of proposals using the 71 proposals in our case-control study,
preserving each grouping K. Then, for each proposal ?, we identified whether there was at least
one business comment expressing opposition (NOOJ0P! = 1) and at least one business comment
expressing support ([WOOJ+B! = 1), with no-comment as the base category (21 of the proposals
had no comments). We then constructed two new expenditure variables: Lobby Expenditure
Oppose for the expenditure of the most actively lobbying business organization opposed to the
proposal, and Lobby Expenditure Support for the expenditure of the most actively lobbying
business organization supportive of the proposal, where “active” is measured by the amount
spent lobbying the agency during the time in which the proposal was published.28 Our
relationship of interest is then:
Pr(<! = 1) = IJK?B &' (&- + M' NOOJ0P! + M) [WOOJ+B! +
M* IJQQRSTONOOJ0P! × NOOJ0P! +
M+ IJQQRSTO[WOOJ+B! × [WOOJ+B! ).

(3)

Figure 2 shows the substantive results from estimating (3), in terms of changes in the probability
of withdrawal as a function of the coalition type.29 As before, opposition is associated with an
27

We recognize that our measure of congressional lobbying includes all lobbying a group makes to Congress, on
any issue and with respect to any agency, and that our PAC contributions data are aggregated (as in Gordon and
Hafer 2005). We do not have a measure for congressional lobbying that specifically targets the agency which has
issued a proposal, nor of PAC spending that might be discernibly associated with a particular agency’s oversight
committee. It is possible, of course, that such targeted congressional lobbying or PAC spending—that is, lobbying or
spending more clearly aimed at the agency or its regulatory policies—could have an intimidating effect. If such
measures of more targeted congressional lobbying or PAC spending could be obtained, and if they were to turn out
to be associated with withdrawals of regulatory proposals, this too would be broadly consistent with our principal
findings here. Our results indicate merely that a business group’s aggregate “muscle-flexing” (e.g., its overall level
of congressional lobbying or its aggregate PAC spending) does not appear to matter much to an agency. Rather, it is
targeted lobbying—shown here with our data on lobbying the agency itself—that matters, when combined with
opposition to a regulatory proposal. In other words, the retreating effect, as our model implies, appears to be an
outgrowth of clearly targeted signals of intimidation directed to the agency, not of the overall strength of a
business’s lobbying muscle. Our results across time periods are also consistent with this conclusion. On the
assumption that most firms will not markedly change their size or overall “muscle” over the course of a single year,
our null effects for t-1 year but positive effects for t are consistent with targeted lobbying as what matters.
28
As before, we limit this time to include the quarter in which the proposal was issued and the subsequent three
quarters.
29
Appendix C includes the table of regression coefficients used to construct the predicted withdrawal probabilities
in Figure 2.
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increase in the likelihood of withdrawal. This can clearly be seen by comparing Panel A, where
there is at least one oppositional comment and no supportive comments, to the opposite case in
Panel D, where the only comments are supportive ones. With only supportive comments, the
withdrawal rate is nearly zero. And with only oppositional comments, the withdrawal rate ranges
from about 0.2 to nearly 1.0, depending on the level of lobbying activity of the opposition: the
more lobbying, the greater the probability the opposition succeeds at getting a withdrawal.
Mixed coalitions are also associated with the probability of withdrawal. Panels B and C suggest
that a supportive comment can have a neutralizing effect on an oppositional comment, although
this appears to depend on how much lobbying the commenters engaged in. Panel B fixes the
expenditure of the opposition (Lobby Expenditure Oppose) at the maximal value in our data and
Figure 2: Withdrawal Probabilities by Coalition Type (Proposal-level Results)
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shows the withdrawal rate falling in association with a rise in the expenditures of the supportive
commenter. Panel C shows the opposite case, where the expenditure of the supporter (Lobby
Expenditure Support) is fixed at its maximal value and the withdrawal rate increases in
association with a rise in the opposition’s expenditure, albeit slightly (a considerable contrast to
Panel A). Although we did not explore this neutralizing effect in our theoretical model, we offer
one intuitive interpretation, namely that appeals to agencies’ principals will be less assured when
the business community is divided. Indeed, Congress and the White House may resist
intervening at all in such divided cases. As a result, when business interests are divided we can
expect the regulator to enjoy a degree of cover, or greater autonomy, from meddling by
legislative and executive actors.

4 Discussion
Our main results show that firms’ investments in lobbying appear to intimidate regulators both
through a chilling effect and a retreating effect. When looking at aggregate data of lobbying
activity and the issuance of new regulatory proposals, we find that more business lobbying at an
agency is associated with that agency issuing fewer proposals, especially proposals that require a
larger upfront investment. When looking at the lobbying activity surrounding individual
regulatory proposals that have been issued—i.e., not chilled—we find that lobbying by a
business interest that opposes a new regulatory proposal is associated with a greater likelihood
that the agency retreats and withdraws the proposal.
Several leading alternative theories of interest group influence have been developed that might
plausibly explain what we observe in terms of chilling and retreating effects. One leading theory
of interest group influence, for example, focuses on exchange or contract as the key mechanism
of influence (e.g. Grossman and Helpman 2002; Stigler 1971). In this theory, groups are able to
purchase the policies they want, such as by making campaign contributions to members of
Congress that oversee a regulator of interest. From what we could determine by looking at the
campaign contributions of those groups that lobbied regulators, we saw no evidence that giving
more money to lawmakers increased firms’ leverage over regulatory outcomes. In other words,
businesses do not appear to be purchasing the policies they want, at least from members of
Congress.
Another leading theory of group influence is predicated on persuasion, whereby outsiders can
influence a policymaker by providing compelling policy information. Although we cannot reject
the possibility that the provision of policy information shaped at least some of the results in our
analysis, we have suggestive evidence that the influence of this mechanism may be overstated.
For one, we were unable to find any evidence that the length of a group’s comment, which is
likely correlated with the amount of information it conveys, has any impact on a regulator’s
decision to withdraw a proposal (see Table 3 and, for a more detailed analysis, Appendix C).30
More subtly, we also find that regulatory agencies are highly responsive to oppositional firms,
namely those that express a preference for blocking a regulator’s proposal. The asymmetric
30
This echoes a finding by Yackee and Yackee (2006, p.136) that the amount of policy information contained in a
comment does not correlate with the likelihood that the regulator is responsive to the comment.
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responsiveness we observe would seem to stand at odds with the implications of most persuasion
models, as persuasive communication is much more effective when the sender and receiver of
information share common goals, e.g., a case where both the firm and regulator want to change
the status quo (Potters and Winden 1992; Austen-Smith 1995).31
A final theory, one we recognize was developed with Congress not regulators in mind, posits that
lobbying by outside groups serves chiefly to subsidize policymakers, that is, to help them
achieve their preferred policy goals (Hall and Deardorff 2006). If imported into the regulatory
context, one implication of this theory would be that lobbying should be positively associated
with the number of regulatory proposals developed, since lobbyists target their efforts where they
support the development of policy change, and then they offer assistance by writing regulatory
language or providing needed technical analysis. Our evidence, however, suggests just the
opposite, namely that lobbying appears to chill the amount of regulatory activity—a pattern we
find both at the aggregate level, looking across all agencies (see Table 2), as well as at the
proposal level, where firms that lobby more appear are associated with agencies retreating from
the proposals that the firms oppose (see Figure 2).
Even though lobbying appears to be an effective strategy of influence-seeking, one might well
ask why more business groups—or even all of them—do not engage in lobbying in an effort to
shape regulatory outcomes. Empirically, many business interests simply file comments on
proposed regulations without investing in lobbying the agency. Indeed, we found that, overall,
only 20 percent of the commenters in our case control study in section 3 had lobbied the relevant
agency in the prior quarter. Slightly less than that had lobbied the agency in the prior year (25
percent), and only 40 percent of commenters had lobbied any federal agency in the prior year.32
The signaling model we develop provides an explanation for why not all firms that seek
influence will resort to lobbying. Intuitively, the more firms that lobby—particularly firms that
vary in their ability to appeal a regulatory decision—the less informative lobbying will be to the
regulator about whether a firm could cause trouble for the agency through an appeal to the
agency’s overseers. In the limit, if lobbying ceases to be informative, lobbying will no longer
have any impact on a regulator’s decision-making. Since the firms in our model are strategic,
they anticipate such a possibility. They will only invest in lobbying when lobbying will increase
the likelihood of a regulatory decision that is favorable to them. What we show is that strategic
behavior can often lead to a sorting effect (a separating equilibrium in our model) where the
firms that can actually mount a successful appeal will invest in lobbying, and the firms that
cannot do so will instead eschew lobbying. In essence, the existence of this sorting effect is what
makes lobbying informative to the regulator. It is also what can make lobbying intimidating.33
Our analysis raises still broader questions about the influence of commenting and how its
efficacy compares with other interest group tactics in the regulatory process (Kerwin and
Furlong 2019). Commenting may be the most visible and easily studied influence-seeking
31

These predictions can change if the lobbyist’s information can be verified by the receiver, e.g., Austen-Smith and
Wright (1994), although agencies typically face legal and practical obstacles to extracting information that firms will
not voluntarily provide (Coglianese, Zeckhauser, and Parson 2004).
32
We find similar patterns when looking only at the business interests that filed oppositional comments.
33
For a formal elaboration of this logic with reference to our model, see Appendix A.
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behavior in the regulatory process, but our analysis casts some doubt on whether it is, at least by
itself, the most influential tactic available to businesses and other interest groups. Our model and
empirical evidence suggest that lobbying—and, by extension, intimidation—may be more
significant in terms of shaping what regulatory agencies do. The ability to chill regulations from
being proposed in the first place—a type of “second face” of power (e.g., Bachrach and Baratz
1962)—seems a much more significant power that can be wielded by those opposed to regulation
than any ability to convince agencies to soften their regulatory proposals even as they still issue
them as final rules (e.g., Yackee and Yackee 2006). Similarly, the ability to influence agencies to
such a degree that they will withdraw already published regulatory proposals seems a substantial
policy victory that lobbying—and, hence, intimidation—can achieve. Perhaps, in the end, what
we find may even provide a further indication that, as some observers of the regulatory process
have opined, commenting is more of a “stylized ritual” (Kerwin and Furlong 2019:110), or more
“theater” than substance (Elliott 1991), with most of the important action taking place offstage.
Although our empirical evidence supports a strong association between lobbying and
intimidation, there can still be instances where business lobbying does not ultimately intimidate
agencies. The Food and Drug Administration’s tobacco rulemaking in the 1990s was one such
case. Despite strenuous lobbying efforts by tobacco industry interests, the agency did not back
away from its highly contested rule (Kessler 2001; Fritschler & Rudder 2007). Consistent with
the structure of our model, however, the business groups opposed to the tobacco rulemaking did
pursue an appeal that resulted in the Supreme Court striking down the agency’s rule (FDA v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. 2000).

5 Conclusion
This paper makes a number of contributions both to our understanding of regulatory
policymaking and to the ways that interest groups can influence the policy process. For one, we
draw attention to a mechanism of influence that has been underappreciated in the context of
agency rulemaking, whereby business lobbying communicates political information, not just
policy information, to shape policy outcomes to their advantage. When successful, this strategy
of intimidation can reduce the number of new regulations an agency adopts, in part because the
strategy rests on the implicit threat that groups can appeal the outcomes they oppose to a
regulatory agency’s principal.
Consistent with the implications of our model, we have presented empirical evidence that
business lobbying is associated with chilling the production of regulatory activity and with
regulators’ retreat from their intended courses of action. Past empirical research on agency
rulemaking has tended to overlook both the retreating and chilling effects of lobbying, as it has
focused in isolation on interest group participation in the comment process without considering
the inferences regulators can draw from groups’ lobbying efforts. As a result, business groups
appear to be more influential in shaping rulemaking outcomes than has been previously
appreciated—particularly by using lobbying to shape agencies’ agendas and to influence what
regulations are never developed.
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Appendix A. Model
Notation
Firm types: We use the notation MR for “moderate regulation,” LR for “low regulation,” HC for
“high cost,” and LC for “low cost,” which yields four firm types: MRHC, MRLC, LRHC and
LRLC
Appeal cost. The Firm’s appeal cost is either high or low, which we denote as 1./ and 10/ .
Utilities. Each player’s utility over policy outcomes T ∈ {!, ", ℎ} is denoted by W!1 for ? = _, `
and O for the policy preference of each player, e.g., HR. The payoff function a! (⋅) for each actor
is:
a2 (T; 0, +, O) = W21 (T) − 0 − +
a3 (T; /, 1, O) = W31 (T) − / – 14

eJ+ f = gY, IY

Assumption 1 (payoffs): The player’s payoffs are:
•
•
•
•

67
67
h67
5 (i) = j; h5 (k) = l; h5 (m) = l + n;
87
87
h87
5 (i) = j; h5 (k) = l; h5 (m) = l − n;
87
87
h9 (i) = j; h9 (k) = l; h87
9 (m) = l − n;
:7
:7
h9 (i) = j; h9 (k) = −l; h:7
9 (m) = −(l + n),

where n > l. (In Figure 1, n was set to 1.5.) Note that the MR firm and MR agency have the
same payoffs.
Assumption 2 (appeal costs):
We put the following constraints on the appeal costs.
•
•
•

1./ < min{r − 1, 1}
10/ > max {r − 1, 1}
10/ < 1 + r

Assumption 2 means that the LRLC firm will appeal " or ℎ, and the LRHC firm and the MRLC
firm will appeal ℎ (see the third column of Table 1 in the main text). These assumptions follow
from a comparison of utilities. The LRLC firm will appeal " (and ℎ by extension): 1./ <
W3.; (!) − W3.; (") = 1. The LRHC firm will appeal ℎ but not ": 10/ < W3.; (!) − W3.; (ℎ) =
1 + r and 10/ > W3.; (!) − W3.; (") = 1. The MRLC firm will appeal ℎ: 1./ < W3<; (!) −
W3<; (ℎ) = r − 1. And the MRHC firm will not appeal ℎ: 10/ > W3<; (!) − W3<; (ℎ) = r − 1.
Assumption 3: We assume the following relationship between the appeal cost 10/ and the cost
to lobby /:

A-1

•

/ < 1 < 10/ < 1 + /.

Assumption 3 means that the LRHC firm prefers to lobby and get ! than to get ", and that the
firm prefers both of these options to appealing and getting !, all which top the firm’s least
preferred option to lobby and get ": W3.; (!) − / ≥ W3.; (") ≥ W3.; (!) − 1 ≥ W3.; (") − /.
Equilibrium
Definition. The Firm sends two messages to the Agency: R' = {P, UP} is the early lobbying
message where P denotes an expenditure and UP denotes no expenditure; and R) =
{(P, 0), (P, J), (UP, 0), (UP, J)}, is the post-proposal lobbying message combined with the
comment message, where 0 is a supportive comment and J is an oppositional comment.
The equilibrium concept is perfect Bayesian. The Agency uses Bayes’ rule to update beliefs
about the Firm’s type after observing R' and R) . And the Firm uses Bayes’ rule to update beliefs
about the Agency’s type after observing the Agency’s proposal. An equilibrium consists of the
following for the Firm: two messages (R' and R) ) and an appeal, as well as a set of beliefs u3
about the Agency’s type. For the Agency, an equilibrium strategy consists of a proposal strategy
(T' = {!, ", ℎ}, where ! denotes no proposal since it is the status quo), and a final policy (T) =
{!, ", ℎ}, where ! denotes a withdrawal and " denotes a revision if T' = ℎ), as well as a set of
beliefs u2 about the Firm’s type that are consistent with the strategies taken in equilibrium.
A.3 Analysis
The interval of , values that we focus on is given by the following lemma.
Lemma Assume the low-regulation types pool and can reveal that they are low-regulation.
There exists an interval , ∈ [,4(0), ,̅] where the low-regulation types prefer to lobby early
rather than post-proposal. As 0 approaches 0, the size of the interval approaches 0.
Proof:
When the low-regulation types pool and are the only types to lobby early, the Agency holds
beliefs that vw(x = yz) = { and vw(x = |z) = l − {. The Agency would propose k if
the expected utility of doing so, which would risk an intervention from LR-LC, exceeded the
status quo payoff h5 (i) = j. The expected utility of proposing, given updated beliefs is
{(h=5 (i) + }) + (l − {)h=5 (k) − ~. The Agency proposes if { is sufficiently small. Define
{
8 and the value that makes the Agency indifferent about proposing:
,
4=

W2# (") − 0
, eJ+ B = Ä, gÄ
W2# (") + +

(_1)

Now consider the case where the proposal has been made and the Agency is weighing whether to
withdraw the proposal. The expected payoff for the Agency is identical except the startup cost is
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already sunk: SÅ2 (T = ") = ,(W2# (!) + 1) + (1 − ,)W2# ("). θ must be sufficiently small
for the Agency to keep the proposal. Define ,̅ as the value that makes the Agency indifferent
about keeping the proposal:
,̅ =

W2# (")
, eJ+ B = Ä, gÄ
W2# (") + +

(_2)

For , ∈ [,
4 , ,̅ ], the low-regulation types have an incentive to lobby early if it induces the Agency
to keep T = !. If they do not (e.g, if they lobby post-proposal) the Agency will keep the proposal
at x = m. (By Assumption 1, when this happens the low-regulation types separate whereby
LRHC does not lobby because pooling with LRHC yields W3.; (") − / and separating yields
W3.; ("), which is greater given that / > 0.
Finally, from the defined payoffs listed above, note that W20; (") = W2<; (") = 1, so that the
cutpoints ,4 and ,̅ do not depend on the Agency’s type.
Outside the interval [,
4 (0), ,̅]. Note that to the left of ,
4 LR firms have no incentive to pool and
lobby early because the Agency will still issue a proposal when they do, by A1. LRLC is
indifferent about lobbying earlier or post-proposal and LRHC does not lobby at all. By contrast,
to the right of ,̅, the opposition type will still pool, but here they have no extra incentive to lobby
early. If they can distinguish themselves from the moderate-regulation firms later by sending an
oppositional comment, they will lobby post-proposal. In essence, regardless of whether the lowregulation types lobby early or post-proposal, the Agency responds by not regulating because the
Agency’s prior believe that the Firm is likely LRLC, not the less threatening LRHC.
Proof of Proposition 1 (Chilling Effect)
We first state the following definition.
Definition 1: The Agency’s beliefs about the Firm’s type after observing the Firm’s decision to
lobby early are given by u2' and the Agency’s beliefs about the Firm’s type after observing the
Firm’s decision to lobby post-proposal and the Firm’s statement (comment) about the proposal
are given by u2) .
For a PBE to hold, no firm type can have an incentive to defect, given the beliefs held in
equilibrium. After observing early lobbying, the Agency holds beliefs u2' = Pr(B =
ÄIY, ÄgY, IÄIY, IÄgY | R' = P) = (0, 0, ,, 1 − ,) and the Agency does not issue a
proposal for , ∈ [,4, ,̅], by Lemma 1. Given that this yields the best possible payoff for the lowregulation types, they have no incentive to defect.
Do the moderate-regulation types have an incentive to defect and lobby early? This would dilute
the signal associated with early lobbying. Type MRLC, which always has a stronger incentive to
lobby than MRHC (see Assumption 2), will lobby early only if doing so will ensure that type
LRHC can no longer induce ! by pooling with LRLC (by Assumption 2, LRHC can always
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induce "). If MRLC defects and also lobbies early, the Agency (regardless of its type) forms the
following beliefs using Bayes rule:
u2' = Pr(B = ÄIY, ÄgY, IÄIY, IÄgY | R' = P)
(1 − %), (1 − %)(1 − ,)
%,
=É
, 0,
,
Ñ
%, − % + 1 %, − % + 1 %, − % + 1
The Agency’s expected utility of proposing is then Ö+(B = ÄIY|R' = P)W2# (") + Ö+(B =
IÄIY|R' = P)(W2# (!) − 1) + Ö+(B = IÄgY|R' = P)W2# (") − 0. Using Bayes’ rule and
solving for %, the Agency will propose " (thus breaking the chilling effect) if % is sufficiently
large. Define %
8 as the value that makes the Agency indifferent over proposing:
0 + ,1 − W2# (")(1 − ,)
%
8=
,1 + 0 − 0, − W2# (")(1 − 2,)

(_3)

For % < %
8, the chilling effect will hold even if MRLC lobbies early. For % ≥ %
8 , the Agency will
propose " if MRLC lobbies early, in which case LRHC will not lobby early (see Assumption 3).
To check whether MRLC will, in fact, lobby early (a credible threat), we check whether lobbying
early actually leads to a better payoff for MRLC. MRLC weighs the following in deciding
whether to lobby early. The chilling effect payoff for MRLC is (1 − %)W3<; (!) + %W3<; (").
(Note that this is the best-case chilling effect payoff for MRLC, where T = " is obtained
without lobbying later.) The payoff from lobbying early and ending the chilling effect is
(1 − %),W3<; (!) + (1 − %)(1 − ,)W3<; (") + %,W3<; (") + &%(1 − ,)W3<; (ℎ) +
(1 − &)%(1 − ,)W3<; (") − /. If % is sufficiently small, MRLC’s threat to lobby early is
credible and the chilling effect equilibrium cannot be sustained. Define %Ü as the value that makes
MRLC indifferent about lobbying early:
%Ü =

W3<; (") − ,W3<; (") − /
W3<; (") − ,W3<; (") + &á,(W3<; (ℎ) − W3<; (")à + W3<; (") − W3<; (ℎ))

(_4)

So, when % ∈ [%
8 , %Ü], MRLC’s threat to lobby early is credible, and the Agency would issue a
proposal if MRLC joined the low-regulation firms and lobbied early. The chilling effect is not a
sustainable equilibrium in this region.
Corollary: In the absence of early lobbying, the Agency proceeds as follows: (a) When , ≥ ,9 the
Agency proposes ", regardless of its type, and there is no post-proposal lobbying; (b) When , <
,9 the Agency proposes ℎ or ", depending on its preferred policy, and the Agency only revises its
proposal (to ") if it initially chose ℎ and there is post-proposal lobbying (the Agency knows that
only the moderate-regulation, low-cost firm lobbies in this case).
Proof:
If the chilling effect equilibrium holds and the Agency observes no early lobbying, the Agency
then holds beliefs u2' = Pr(B = ÄIY, ÄgY, IÄIY, IÄgY | R' = UP) = (,, 1 − ,, 0 , 0). If
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the Agency proposes ℎ, the strategy of the moderate-regulation firms depends on the cutpoint ,9
(if the Agency proposes ", both moderate-regulation firms pool and send supportive comments.)
Using Bayes rule, the Agency’s expected utility from keeping ℎ, its initial proposal, is
(1 − ,)W20; (ℎ) − ,(W20; (!) + +), where W20; (!) + + follows from MRLC’s willingness to
appeal ℎ, in which case the Agency suffers the reputation cost + (see Assumption 2). The
Agency’s utility of revising to " is W20; ("). If the moderate-regulation firms pool, the Agency
keeps ℎ if , is sufficiently small. Define ,9 as the value of , where the Agency is indifferent
about revising ℎ when the moderate-regulation types pool:
,9 =

W20; (ℎ) − W20; (")
W20; (ℎ) + +

(_5)

For , < ,9, the moderate-regulation firms do not pool and both lobby because MRHC would
receive the payoff W3<; (ℎ) − /, which is the Firm’s worst payoff, obviously worse than simply
accepting W3<; (ℎ) without lobbying (see Assumption 3).
Proof of Proposition 2
The retreating effect equilibrium is sustained in the region , ∈ [,
4 , ,̅], where the chilling effect
does not hold (when % is sufficiently large, % ≥ %
8 , as given by Equation A3).
Proof:
Assume that all types play as described in Proposition 2. We first consider whether the lowregulation firms have an incentive to defect by switching their lobbying strategies.
Lobbying early (and alone) provides no benefit to LRHC (see also Assumption 3, which clarifies
that lobbying and receiving " is LRHC’s worst payoff). By Assumption 2, LRHC can always
get " by simply sending an oppositional comment (only LRHC sends this message in
equilibrium because LRLC lobbies, and the moderate regulation firms send supportive
comments). LRHC will also not pool with LRLC and lobby post-proposal. For , ∈ [,
4 , ,̅] the
Agency will set " when these types pool post-proposal (see Lemma 1). Since LRHC can receive
" without lobbying, pooling with LRLC makes LRHC worse off.
LRLC can defect and lobby early instead of post-proposal, although it does not change LRLC’s
payoff. Regardless of when LRLC lobbies (LRLC is indifferent), LRLC can always induce the
Agency to set policy !. But LRLC has no incentive to not lobby (i.e., pool with LRHC) because
the payoff from lobbying and revealing its type dominates the payoff from pooling with LRHC
and paying for an appeal: W3.; (!) − / > W3.; (!) − 1, since 1 > / (by assumption).
Now consider the moderate-regulation firms. Unlike LRLC, MRLC is not indifferent about when
to lobby because MRLC prefers ", which the Agency will propose with probability 1 − & when
it too prefers ". This possibility makes early lobbying less appealing to MRLC. Now, MRHC
generally has an incentive to pool with MRLC, so MRHC will not lobby early (and alone) since
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doing so would cost / and the Agency would set its ideal point (" or ℎ) since the Agency is not
threatened by MRHC (see Assumption 2).
Now consider the statement from the proposition that the moderate-regulation types pool for , ≥
,9 and separate for , < ,9. This follows from the same reasoning in Proposition 1. Now consider
the case where the high-cost types pool. MRHC has an incentive to pool with LRHC only when
doing so will induce ". When these high-cost types pool, the high-regulation Agency will set "
if % is sufficiently small (the probability of the more threatening LRHC is sufficiently likely).
The pooling is mutually beneficial because both types prefer " to ℎ (note that LRHC is never
able to induce its preferred policy, !, because it cannot pool with LRLC). The high-regulation
Agency prefers to set " when W20; (") > %W20; (ℎ) + (1 − %)(W20; (!) − +). Define %ã has the
value of % that makes the Agency indifferent between setting h and m whereby
%ã =

W20; (") + +
W20; (ℎ) + +

Now, for % > %ã, there exists a fully separating equilibrium. Type MRHC and LRHC eschew
lobbying and send different comments. In this case, MRHC will not pool with LRHC because
pooling would lead the Agency to set ℎ, which would induce LRHC to appeal the proposal and
trigger the policy !. Obviously MRHC prefers " to !. LRHC also prefers not to pool. Pooling
yields W30/ (!) − 1, a payoff that is worse than if LRHC could just reveal its identity, in which
case the Agency would set " to ward off an appeal and LRHC would receive W0/ ("), a better
payoff by Assumption 3.
Alternative Equilibrium
Early Lobbying by Supportive Types: The chilling effect equilibrium is not always the unique
equilibrium. It is possible, in regions of the parameter space, to sustain an equilibrium where the
moderate-regulation types lobby early. This size of this region is, however, relatively small when
compared to the chilling effect region because the moderate-regulation types face a tradeoff
when lobbying early that the low-regulation types do not face. Intuitively, when & is small so
that the probability that the Agency prefers the same outcome as the moderate-regulation types is
large, the moderate-regulation firms have no incentive to pay to lobby. Instead, they do better by
waiting and only taking action if the Agency proposes ℎ (which happens with probability 1 − &).
By contrast, the low-regulation firms prefer the status quo and always have at least some
incentive to influence the Agency’s decision-making, regardless of the value of &.
To sustain an equilibrium where the moderate-regulation types lobby early, , must be large and
& must be large such that the Agency is likely to have extreme preferences. Now, consider an
equilibrium in the region , > ,9 (where, by Proposition 1, moderate-regulation types can pool
and induce "). Is there an equilibrium where the moderate-regulation types lobby early? If they
did, they would receive W3<; (") − /. If either type defected (MRLC or MRHC), the payoff
would be ,W3<; (") + (1 − ,)(&W3<; (ℎ) + (1 − &)W3<; (")). Solving for , yields,
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,<

W3<; (") − &W3<; (ℎ) − (1 − &)W3<; (") − /
W3<; (") − &W3<; (ℎ) − (1 − &)W3<; (")

(_6)

This suggests that the window is small. , has to be larger than ,9 (or else moderate-regulation
type will not pool) and , has to be small enough to satisfy A6. Furthermore, & has to be
sufficiently large in order to satisfy A6. By contrast, when the low-regulation types weigh
whether to lobby early, they do not even consider the value of & because, as discussed, when
they pool they can always induce at least ", if not the status quo, !.
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Appendix B. Data & Research Design
B.1 Data on Lobbying Reports
The lobbying data is available from the Center for Responsive Politics (the CRP data) at
http://www.OpenSecrets.org/lobby/. The CRP data is compiled using the lobbying reports that
lobbyists are required to file under the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 (the LDA). An
example report is shown in Appendix Figure 1.
Expenditure data is in units of $10,000’s (2008 dollars).
Identifying the lobbying targets. Each quarterly lobbying disclosure form reports the amount
spent on lobbying in that quarter and the targets that were lobbied (e.g., Congress, the FCC, etc.).
In this paper, we split the reported amount spent on lobbying evenly across all the targets listed.
In Appendix C below, we report similar results using two different approaches. The first
allocates the entire reported expenditure to each target listed. The second discards the
expenditure and uses a count of the number of reports that list an agency.
What is (and is not) lobbying. We use the term lobbying as it is defined in the LDA (see USC. As
discussed in the main text, agencies frequently solicit policy information from the regulated
community when developing regulations, and these solicitations typically do not count as
lobbying under the LDA. This would include a written submission in response to an agency’s
request for information (either an informal request or a more formal solicitation in the federal
register). Other activities that would not qualify as lobbying include participation in public
hearings, responses to formal requests for information, as well as comments filed during noticeand-comment are not lobbying (K&L Gates 2019).
Lobbying reports. Note that a lobbying entity may file more than four quarterly reports per year.
For example, Business Roundtable issued 68 reports in 2014 because they hired lobbying firms
that filed their own reports on behalf of Business Roundtable. Groups are required to file a
lobbying report when they spend more than a fixed threshold on lobbying within a quarter. (The
current threshold is $14,000). The existence of this threshold introduces a potential bias in our
analysis against finding an effect from reported lobbying; that is, reported lobbying could look
less influential in our regression models if unreported lobbying is having a systematic influence
on regulatory policymaking.
B.2 Data on Regulatory Activity
Rulemaking data. To obtain the data on regulatory activity we downloaded XML files of the
Unified Agenda from https://www.reginfo.gov/public/. The Unified Agenda categorizes
proposals by their expected impact on society and the economy. We limit our analysis to the top
three impact categories: (i) economically significant, (ii) significant; and (iii) substantive. The
lower impact categories include routine and administrative rules. The economically significant
rules are those that are estimated to have an annual societal impact of at least $100 million per
year. The criteria for the other two categories is less specific: the significant proposals are
presumed to have a greater impact, societal or otherwise, than substantive proposals.
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Merging lobbying data to Unified Agenda data. In the chilling effect analysis (Table 2 of main
text) we limit the agencies to those where a direct match can be made between the agency in the
lobbying record and the agency in the Unified Agenda. This drops cases where, for example,
regulatory data is available at the sub-department level and lobbying data is only available at the
department level. This makes our estimates more conservative since we have both fewer
observations and we only focus on the cases with a direct linkage between lobbying expenditures
and the agency. In the retreating effect analysis (Table 3 of the main text) the results are robust to
only including the agencies where there is a direct match, although this limits the analysis to only
six agencies (FWS, IRS, CFTC, NOAA, FRA and FHFB.)
Appendix Figure 3: LDA Disclosure Filing

B.3 Chilling Effect Analysis
Appendix Table 1 lists the 69 agencies that we were able to merge with the lobbying data. We
dropped any independent regulatory commissions from the sample since reporting in the Unified
Agenda for the commissions can be unreliable (Copeland 2015).
The columns in Appendix Table 1 labeled Total Amount, Amount Split and Number of Reports
give quarterly averages for each agency. So, for example, row 1 shows that there are, on average,
478 lobbying reports each quarter that mention the Department of State.
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Appendix Table 2 shows the summary statistics for variables used in the chilling effect analysis.
The unit of analysis is an agency-quarter observation so, for example, the median lobbying
expenditure targeted at an agency in a given quarter is $590,000.

Appendix Table 1: Agencies Used in Aggregate Analysis

Agency
Department of State
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services
Food and Drug Administration
Internal Revenue Service
Federal Reserve System
Patent and Trademark Office
Federal Aviation Administration
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Department of Veterans Affairs
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Health Resources and Services Administration
Small Business Administration
National Telecommunications and Information Administration
General Services Administration
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Comptroller of the Currency
Federal Emergency Management Agency
U.S. Coast Guard
Bureau of Land Management
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
Surface Transportation Board
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
National Institute of Standards and Technology
Federal Housing Finance Board
National Labor Relations Board
Federal Highway Administration
Federal Transit Administration
Federal Railroad Administration
Office of Personnel Management
Drug Enforcement Administration
Occupational Safety and Health Administration
International Trade Administration
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
Social Security Administration
Forest Service
Bureau of Indian Affairs
Office of Thrift Supervision
Minerals Management Service
Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
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Dept.
STATE
HHS
HHS
TREAS
FRS
COM
DOT
FDIC
VA
DOD
DOE
DHS
HHS
SBA
COM
GSA
NASA
TREAS
DHS
DHS
DOI
HHS
COM
DOT
DOT
COM
FHFB
NLRB
DOT
DOT
DOT
OPM
DOJ
DOL
COM
DOI
SSA
AG
DOI
TREAS
DOI
TREAS
DOT

Total
Amount
15510
8713
7638
6383
7229
5439
4183
4314
3407
3355
2382
3259
1964
2985
1580
2809
2223
2381
1670
1683
1387
1287
1533
1277
1456
2408
1492
2489
1426
1114
676
1140
707
1095
832
1120
860
787
289
646
547
210
559

Amount
Split
1416
1378
785
579
564
395
361
304
290
280
263
208
188
174
173
155
147
145
142
142
140
131
131
129
128
124
108
96
95
89
85
85
79
77
74
72
62
58
52
44
41
41
39

Number
of
Reports
478
574
309
169
113
68
152
70
176
205
84
114
116
85
44
83
75
36
70
68
68
124
109
31
51
40
29
24
60
63
44
39
18
43
47
52
29
58
91
14
11
15
16

Agency
National Transportation Safety Board
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration
Federal Bureau of Investigation
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
National Credit Union Administration
National Park Service
Farm Credit Administration
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
National Indian Gaming Commission
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives
Economic Development Administration
Bureau of the Census
Mine Safety and Health Administration
Railroad Retirement Board
Employment Standards Administration
National Archives and Records Administration
Bureau of Prisons
Employment and Training Administration
Financial Management Service
National Endowment for the Humanities
Federal Housing Finance Agency
Bureau of Economic Analysis
Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement
Institute of Museum and Library Services
Peace Corps

Dept.
NTSB
DHS
DOT
DOJ
DHS
NCUA
DOI
FCA
TREAS
NIGC
DOJ
COM
COM
DOL
RRB
DOL
NARA
DOJ
DOL
TREAS
NEH
HUD
COM
DOI
IMLS
PEACE

Appendix Table 2: Aggregate Analysis, Summary Statistics
Lobbying Data
Split expenditure (10,000 USD)
Total expenditure (10,000 USD)
Number of reports

Median

Mean

Std. Dev.

59
717
34

151
1727
65

264
2660
98

.64
.16
.1

2
.67
.62

Regulation Data (Unified Agenda)
Number of proposals
0
Number of significant proposals
0
Number of withdrawals
0
Note: Expenditure data is in $10,000 (2008 dollars)
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Total
Amount
498
645
451
674
414
291
210
362
178
90
77
62
241
67
75
58
50
55
23
13
14
26
75
16
5
13

Amount
Split
37
37
33
33
30
26
24
20
20
20
18
10
10
9
7
5
5
4
3
2
2
2
2
1
1
1

Number
of
Reports
21
23
29
20
25
11
35
9
4
28
7
22
8
9
4
3
6
6
8
2
6
0
1
1
3
1

B.4 Case Control Study (Retreating Effect Analysis)
Identifying the cases. We identified the withdrawn proposals using withdrawal notices in the
Unified Agenda. Within the three regimes we focus on, we identified 60 potential cases. Of
these, we kept those where the reason for withdrawal could plausibly be due to pressure by
interest groups during the comment period, since we want to isolate withdrawals that were the
result of outside pressure. In doing so, we dropped cases where:
1. The agency indicated that a statutory change had rendered the proposal moot or a lawsuit
had struck down the proposal;
2. The proposal was listed as withdrawn but was actually merged or duplicated by another
proposal;
3. No comment period took take place;
4. We could find no corroborating evidence, such as in the Federal Register, that the
NPRM was actually published; and
5. The withdrawal only referred to a direct final rule associated with the same RIN.
Ultimately we identified 32 withdrawal cases.
Matching the withdrawals to completed proposals. To create the groupings of withdrawn and
completed proposals, we matched each withdrawal to as many as four completed proposals,
using the criteria described in the main text. For example, one grouping is the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), implementing Title 7 of the U.S. Code with nonsignificant regulatory proposals during the 110th Congress. This grouping includes eight
proposals because there were two withdrawals in this grouping and we were able to find matches
to three competed proposals for each. Had there been more matches, the grouping could have
had as many as ten proposals (two withdrawals, each matched to four completed proposals.)
When there are more potential matches, we used a random number generator to select the
matches.
Overall, based on the matching criteria described in the main text, we found matches for 20
withdrawals, yielding a total sample size of 71 proposals. Appendix Table 3 lists all the
proposals, whether they were withdrawn, the number of comments, the number of comments that
opposed the regulation, as well as the administration and Congress in which the proposal was
made.
Collecting the public comments. Most comments were collected from Regulations.gov, though
some agencies during the Bush administration stored public comments on their own website,
such as the CFTC. We dropped all comments where the commenter did not list an
organizational affiliation, e.g., individuals commenting in their capacity as private, unaffiliated
citizens. We also dropped comments where the commenter did not attach a comment but instead
wrote their comment in a text box, notably without including any letterhead. In most cases, this
dropped comments from private citizens who claimed an organizational affiliation with, for
example, an environmental group like Friends of the Earth, but had no formal role in the
organization (and, consequently, did not have access to the organization's letterhead). Finally,
we dropped comments from groups that did not represent business interests. This includes, for
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example, not-for-profit educational institutions. The remaining commenters are, by and large,
non-profit trade groups, like the American Petroleum Institute, corporations, like BP, and smaller
firms. If the comment was submitted by a law firm or lobbyist, we attribute the comment to the
firm's client and keep only those where the client is a business interest.
The public comments. In most cases, we downloaded comment letters at www.regulations.gov,
although some agencies still keep comment letters on their own websites for older rules, which is
where we obtained them.
We found most comments to be organized as follows: 1) a stated position on the proposed
regulation; 2) background on the organization or firm submitting the comment; and 3) an
itemization of specific the concerns. To demonstrate, we include two sample comments in this
Appendix:
1. A supportive comment from the National Association of Home Builders (NAHB) to the
Federal Housing Finance Board (FHFB) (see Appendix Figure 2 below).
2. An oppositional BP comment to MMS (see Appendix Figure 3 below);
In the case of the NAHB comment, no concerns are raised and the comment is entirely
supportive. The letter emphasizes political information, like the number of members, which is
stated in the first sentence.
Coding the public comments. For each comment, we had two research assistants code the
comment as either in opposition to the proposal or supporting the proposal. A comment that
asked for the proposal to be revised was coded as supporting the proposal, although in some
cases we coded an opposition comment as one where the revision asked for would effectively
undermine the proposal. In general, the supportive comments demonstrate a wider range of
cases, ranging from those where the proposal is enthusiastically endorsed to those where the
commenter merely expresses a willingness to work with the agency to shape the direction of the
final rule. In the few cases where the coders came to different conclusions, one of the authors
made the ultimate coding decision. To minimize bias, the comments were shuffled within
groupings so that coding decisions were made without knowledge of whether the relevant
proposal was finalized or withdrawn. The comments and coding decisions are available on
request.
Alternative influence mechanisms (PAC contributions and lobbying Congress). In the main text,
we discuss the possibility that the commenters invest in other influence-seeking expenditures,
namely PAC contributions and lobbying Congress, that could account for the empirical patterns
we observe. For each commenter, we include the dollar amount of all PAC contributions made
by the commenter during the most recent election cycle (the PAC contributions were
downloaded from https://www.opensecrets.org/influence/.). Since we are interested in the
signaling value of the PAC contributions, as in Gordon and Hafer (2005), we do not focus on the
candidates targeted by these contributions, but rather the aggregate amount spent. As in Gordon
and Hafer’s study, groups that make more contributions should be viewed as more intimidating,
or willing to fight unwanted regulations. Using our data in the case control study, we find a
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correlation of 0.65 between groups’ PAC contributions and lobbying expenditures over the same
two-year period of an election cycle.
We also measured the amount each commenter spent lobbying Congress, using the same LDA
reports. As discussed, when an LDA report lists more than two lobbying targets , we cannot
identify the precise lobbying expenditure allocated to each target. To estimate the amount spent
lobbying Congress, we use the same assumption as before and split the total expenditure across
all the targets. Using our data in the case control study, we find a correlation of .58 between
groups’ lobbying expenditure targeted at Congress and the expenditure targeted at the relevant
agency in our study.
Appendix Table 3: Proposals Used in the Case Control Study
Grou
ping
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
5
5
5
5
5
6
6
6
6
7

RIN
3038-AC36
3038-AC40
3038-AC41
3038-AC44
3038-AC45
3038-AC47
3038-AC52
3038-AC55
0648-AY71
0648-AX49
0648-AX60
0648-AY75
0648-BC10
0648-BC33
0648-BA70
0648-BB08
0648-BB50
0648-BC76
0648-BC87
0648-BD16
0750-AF71
0750-AF88
0750-AF58
0750-AF63
0750-AF73
0750-AF74
0750-AF85
0750-AH85
0750-AH49
0750-AH52
0750-AH53
0750-AH95
1904-AC52
1904-AC53
1904-AC58
1904-AC90
1018-AY11

Agency
CFTC
CFTC
CFTC
CFTC
CFTC
CFTC
CFTC
CFTC
NOAA
NOAA
NOAA
NOAA
NOAA
NOAA
NOAA
NOAA
NOAA
NOAA
NOAA
NOAA
DARC (Def.)
DARC (Def.)
DARC (Def.)
DARC (Def.)
DARC (Def.)
DARC (Def.)
DARC (Def.)
DARC (Def.)
DARC (Def.)
DARC (Def.)
DARC (Def.)
DARC (Def.)
EE (DOE)
EE (DOE)
EE (DOE)
EE (DOE)
FWS (Interior)

Admin.
Bush
Bush
Bush
Bush
Bush
Bush
Bush
Bush
Obama
Obama
Obama
Obama
Obama
Obama
Obama
Obama
Obama
Obama
Obama
Obama
Bush
Bush
Bush
Bush
Bush
Bush
Bush
Obama
Obama
Obama
Obama
Obama
Obama
Obama
Obama
Obama
Obama

Cong.
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
111
111
111
111
112-113
112-113
112-113
112-113
112-113
112-113
112-113
112-113
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
112-113
112-113
112-113
112-113
112-113
112-113
112-113
112-113
112-113
112-113
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Code
Title
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
41
41
41
41
41
41
41
41
41
41
41
41
42
42
42
42
16

Withdrawn
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1

N. of
Comm.
8
28
3
4
2
0
0
3
2
0
2
1
3
3
4
0
3
0
2
0
2
0
0
5
0
18
0
2
1
0
0
0
9
11
4
13
2

N. of
Comm.
Oppose
5
22
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
2
0
1
0
2
0
2
0
0
0
0
3
0
0
0
0
0
0
4
0
0
0
1

Grou
ping
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
8
8
8
9
9
10
10
11
11
11
12
12
13
13
13
13
14
14
14
14
14
14
14

RIN
1018-AY26
1018-AZ61
1018-AX72
1018-AX76
1018-AX83
1018-AY19
1018-AY60
1018-AY61
1018-AZ04
1018-AZ36
1018-AZ42
2130-AB93
2130-AB83
2130-AB87
1840-AD10
1840-AD17
3069-AB35
3069-AB34
2502-AI91
2502-AJ17
2502-AJ18
2700-AE12
2700-AE10
1545-BJ11
1545-BI44
1545-BI51
1545-BJ13
1545-BJ56
1545-BJ98
1545-BJ44
1545-BK04
1545-BL28
1545-BL30
1545-BL91

Agency
FWS (Interior)
FWS (Interior)
FWS (Interior)
FWS (Interior)
FWS (Interior)
FWS (Interior)
FWS (Interior)
FWS (Interior)
FWS (Interior)
FWS (Interior)
FWS (Interior)
FRA (Trans.)
FRA (Trans.)
FRA (Trans.)
OPE (Educ.)
OPE (Educ.)
FHFB
FHFB
OH (HUD)
OH (HUD)
OH (HUD)
NASA
NASA
IRS
IRS
IRS
IRS
IRS
IRS
IRS
IRS
IRS
IRS
IRS

Admin.
Obama
Obama
Obama
Obama
Obama
Obama
Obama
Obama
Obama
Obama
Obama
Bush
Bush
Bush
Obama
Obama
Bush
Bush
Obama
Obama
Obama
Obama
Obama
Obama
Obama
Obama
Obama
Obama
Obama
Obama
Obama
Obama
Obama
Obama

Cong.
112-113
112-113
112-113
112-113
112-113
112-113
112-113
112-113
112-113
112-113
112-113
110
110
110
112-113
112-113
110
110
112-113
112-113
112-113
112-113
112-113
111
111
111
111
112-113
112-113
112-113
112-113
112-113
112-113
112-113
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Code
Title
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
49
49
49
20
20
12
12
12
12
12
51
51
26
26
26
26
26
26
26
26
26
26
26

Withdrawn
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0

N. of
Comm.
6
7
7
1
2
1
1
0
1
9
1
1
3
3
12
14
21
1
14
3
26
0
0
0
1
22
4
14
13
48
15
0
65
8

N. of
Comm.
Oppose
5
7
2
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
3
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
7
11
6
0
0
0
0

Appendix Figure 4: Example Comment
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Appendix Figure 5: BP Comment to MMS
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Appendix C. Additional Results and Robustness Checks
C.1 Chilling Effects
In this section, we re-estimate the models in Table 2 of the main text using different
specifications:
1. Total lobbying expenditure per report. Recall that the results in the main text split the
expenditure for each lobbying report evenly across the entities lobbied. The results are
robust to using the full amount (the total lobbying expenditure). For example, if a report
for $100,000 listed only the EPA and the Department of Agriculture, we assign $100,000
to both agencies, which differs from the measurement in the main text, where we would
have assigned $50,000 to the EPA and $50,000 to the Department of Agriculture.
2. Total number of lobbying reports. Instead of measuring the expenditure by a dollar
amount, we can also measure it by the number of reports filed that mention an agency.
Note that reports are filed quarterly so that the most active groups will issue a minimum
of four reports per year, although they often issue more if they hire a lobbying firm
because that firm will file a separate quarterly report on behalf of their client. Some firms
hire multiple lobbying firms, all of which file separately.
3. Significant proposals only. We use the same expenditure measure as used in the main text
but subset the proposals so that we only use those that were designated as significant.
Note that this drops columns 5 and 6 from the original Table 2 in the main text.
Our results from these re-estimated models are shown in Appendix Table 6 through Appendix
Table 8.

A-18

Appendix Table 2: Lobbying Expenditure uses Total Expenditures on Lobbying Reports
High-cost
Proposals ( !"!" )

All Proposals (!!" )
(1)
Lobby Expt

(2)

(3)

-0.187**
(0.051)

Lobby Expt-1

-0.220

**

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

-0.097

0.029

0.056

0.201

(0.069)

(0.098)

(0.080)

(0.117)

*

**

*

(8)

(9)

(10)
-0.181
(0.111)

**

1.070**
(0.204)

-0.168

-0.304

-0.196

0.893

(0.079)

(0.117)

(0.090)

(0.176)

-0.109

0.026

0.110

0.077

0.199

-0.186

(0.056)

(0.061)

(0.083)

(0.055)

(0.121)

(0.166)

(0.056)
Lobby Expt-2

All Dropped Plans (#!" )

Agency Fixed Effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Quarter Fixed Effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

1,932

1,863

1,794

1,794

Offset
Observations

Yes

1,932

1,863

1,794

1,794

1,794

1,794

Notes: Each model is estimated using a Poisson model that includes an overdispersion parameter. * p<0.05, **p<0.01. By “dropped plans,” we refer to
agencies’ regulatory plans announcing specific proposals that they intended to publish but which they later dropped prior to publication.

A-19

Appendix Table 3: Lobbying Expenditure as Number of Reports
High-cost
Proposals ( !"!" )

All Proposals (!!" )
(1)
Lobby Expt

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

-0.336**

-0.037

0.263

0.280

-0.035

-0.415*

(0.114)

(0.195)

(0.273)

(0.211)

(0.199)

(0.181)

-0.421**

-0.492*

-0.827**

-0.596*

1.305**

0.528

(0.126)

(0.218)

(0.305)

(0.238)

(0.439)

(0.481)

-0.119

0.198

0.385*

0.230*

1.886**

1.715**

(0.110)

(0.122)

(0.157)

(0.104)

(0.474)

(0.593)

Lobby Expt-1

(2)

Lobby Expt-2

(3)

All Dropped Plans (#!" )
(8)

(9)

(10)

Agency Fixed Effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Quarter Fixed Effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

1,932

1,863

1,794

1,794

Offset
Observations

Yes

1,932

1,863

1,794

1,794

1,794

1,794

Notes: Each model is estimated using a Poisson model that includes an overdispersion parameter. * p<0.05, **p<0.01. By “dropped plans,” we refer to agencies’
regulatory plans announcing specific proposals that they intended to publish but which they later dropped prior to publication.
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Appendix Table 4: Chilling Effects (High-cost ("significant") Proposals)

(1)
Lobby Expt

Significant Proposals (!!" )
(2)
(3)

-0.145
(0.093)

Lobby Expt-2

Agency Fixed Effects
Quarter Fixed Effects
Offset
Observations

0.104
(0.108)

-0.073
(0.099)

0.148
(0.142)
-0.575**
(0.175)
0.229
(0.118)

-0.319**
(0.105)

Lobby Expt-1

(4)

Significant Dropped Plans (#!" )
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)

0.712**
(0.200)

-0.233*
(0.105)
0.751**
(0.253)
0.358
(0.260)

0.789**
(0.209)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

1,794

1,794

Yes

1,932

1,863

1,794

1,794

1,932

1,863

Notes: Each model is estimated using a Poisson model that includes an overdispersion parameter. * p<0.05, **p<0.01. By “dropped plans,” we refer to agencies’
regulatory plans announcing specific proposals that they intended to publish but which they later dropped prior to publication.

A-21

C.2 Retreating Effects
Comment-level Analysis. In this section, we re-estimate the models in Table 2 of the main text
using different specifications:
1. Total lobbying expenditures per report. Recall that the results in the main text split the
expenditure for each lobbying report evenly across the entities lobbied. As shown in
Appendix Table 9, the results are robust to using the full amount (the total lobbying
expenditure). For example, if a report for $100,000 listed only the EPA and the
Department of Agriculture, we assign $100,000 to both agencies, which differs from the
measurement in the main text, where we would have assigned $50,000 to the EPA and
$50,000 to the Department of Agriculture.
2. Page length of each comment as a “costly signal.” We replace the lobbying expenditure
with the total comment length as a predictor variable that is interacted with whether a
group opposes a proposal. The relevant results are shown in Appendix Table 10. When
we interacted comment length with opposition to the proposal, we found no evidence that
longer—and potentially more informative—comments opposed to a proposed rule
increased the likelihood of withdrawal.
3. Equation 2 aggregated to the proposal level. We take the data used to estimate Equation
2 and aggregate the data to the level of each proposal, which affects those variables that
are subscribed by ic. This yields a new equation:
Pr($! = 1) = ()*+, "# (- + 0# 1),23455)67! + 0$ 1),23455)678957:;+,<=7! +
0% 1),23>)??7:,(7:*,ℎ! + 0& A<?>)??7:,6! ),
Where Total Oppose is the number of oppositional comments on proposal i and Total
Oppose Expenditure is the logged lobbying expenditure of all the groups that filed an
oppositional comment. Total Comment Length is the total length of all the comments
filed and, as before, Number of Comments is the total number of comments filed in
response to the proposal.
4. Equation 2 using the prior year of lobbying expenditures. In Table 3 of the paper, Lobby
Expenditure measures lobbying expenditures during the quarter in which the NPRM was
published plus the subsequent three quarters. In this robustness check, Lobby
Expenditure now measures the lobbying expenditures during the four quarters prior to the
publication of the NPRM.
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Appendix Table 9: Total Expenditures on Lobbying Reports
Withdrawn
(2)
(3)

(1)
**

(4)

2.769 2.757 2.833 3.003**
(0.607) (0.682) (0.657) (0.671)
-0.029 -0.020 -0.037 -0.040
(0.022) (0.032) (0.026) (0.026)
0.429 0.439 0.429 0.452
(0.332) (0.331) (0.334) (0.343)
-0.015
(0.032)
0.014
(0.021)
0.025
(0.025)
**
**
**
0.872 0.888 0.887 1.003**
(0.195) (0.248) (0.236) (0.218)
0.007
(0.060)
-0.017
(0.046)
-0.075
(0.051)

Oppose
Lobby Exp (Agency)
Comment Length (Logged Pages)
Lobby Exp (All Agencies)
Lobby Exp (Congress)
PAC Expenditure (Prev. cycle)
Oppose × Lobby Exp (Agency)
Oppose × Lobby Exp (All Agencies)
Oppose × Lobby Exp (Congress)
Oppose × PAC Expenditure (Prev. cycle)
Grouping Fixed Effects
Observations

386

Note: Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by proposal in
parentheses. *p<0.05, **p<0.01
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**

386

**

386

386

Appendix Table 10: Page Length Results
Withdrawn
(1)
Page Length (logged)

0.494
(0.325)

Oppose
Oppose × Page Length (logged)
Lobby Expt-1

Grouping Fixed Effects
Observations

(2)

(3)

0.414 0.435 0.434
(0.336) (0.359) (0.360)
3.193** 3.290** 3.291**
(0.602) (0.857) (0.857)
-0.080 -0.081
(0.374) (0.375)
0.001
(0.024)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

386

386

386

386

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by proposal in parentheses. *p<0.05, **p<0.01
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(4)

Appendix Table 11: Data Aggregated to Proposal (Logit Model)
Withdrawn
(1)
(2)
Total Oppose
Total Oppose Lobby Expenditure (logged)
Total Comment Length
Number of Comments

1.026** 0.483
(0.289) (0.274)
13.080**
(0.835)
0.007
0.003
(0.012) (0.010)
-0.128 0.019
(0.069) (0.099)

Grouping Fixed Effects
Yes
Yes
Observations
49
49
*
**
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. p<0.05, p<0.01
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Appendix Table 12: Retreating Effects (Prior Year Lobbying)
Dependent variable:
withdrawn
(1)
(2)
(3)
2.953** 2.754** 2.861**
(0.575) (0.624) (0.610)
Lobby Expenditure (Agency, prior year)
-0.053 -0.049 -0.073*
(0.027) (0.038) (0.033)
Comment Length (Logged Pages)
0.455 0.441 0.440
(0.315) (0.323) (0.322)
Number of Comments (Logged)
-0.341 -0.335 -0.324
(0.564) (0.563) (0.567)
Lobby Exp (All Agencies, current year)
-0.004
(0.032)
Lobby Exp (Congress, current year)
0.027
(0.023)
Oppose x Lobby Exp (Agency, prior year)
0.172 0.132 0.164
(0.127) (0.142) (0.136)
Oppose x Lobby Exp (All Agencies, current year)
0.061
(0.065)
Oppose x Lobby Exp (Congress, current year)
0.020
(0.057)
Oppose

Unit Fixed Effects
Observations

386

386

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05, **p<0.01
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386

Proposal-level Analysis. In this section, we show the coefficients used to make Figure 2 in the
main text, plus robustness checks:
1. Creating Figure 2 in the main text. Figure 2 was created by estimating Equation (3) in
the main text and correcting the intercept for bias, as King and Zeng (2001) suggest, by
%
$
subtracting lnF!"#
G H!"$
I to our estimate of the intercept, where τ is the proportion of
%
#
withdrawals in the population and JK is the proportion of withdrawals in the sample. The
relevant coefficients are shown in Column 3 of Appendix Table 13.
Appendix Table 13: Proposal-level Retreating Effects
Dependent variable:
Withdrawal probability
Oppose
Support

(1)

(2)

(3)

3.125**
(1.060)
-2.037
(1.136)

1.658
(0.977)
-2.174
(1.256)
0.334**
(0.124)

1.723
(0.954)
-1.585
(1.331)
0.399**
(0.128)
-0.157
(0.133)

Yes

Yes

Yes

71

71

71

Oppose × Max Lobby Exp. (opposition group)
Support × Max Lobby Exp. (supportive group)
Grouping Fixed Effects
Observations

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, **p<0.01.
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